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How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (2005), 15; 433-439. urn:nbn:hr:261:797226
Pećnjak, Davor

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Pećnjak, D. (2005). How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5. (15), 433-439. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

Pećnjak, Davor. "How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, br. 15, 2005, str. 433-439. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

Pećnjak, Davor. "How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism." Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5, br. 15 (2005): 433-439. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

Pećnjak, D. (2005) 'How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5(15), str. 433-439. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226 (Datum pristupa: 18.11.2024.)

Pećnjak D. How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2005. [pristupljeno 18.11.2024.];5(15):433-439. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

D. Pećnjak, "How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, br. 15, str. 433-439, 2005. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226. [Citirano: 18.11.2024.]

Za citiranje koristite ovu mrežnu adresu: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226
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Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism
AutorDavor Pećnjak
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
Concerning the question about consciousness, Georges Rey argues that it does not exist from the success of computational theory of human mind. Everything that such a theory requires can be fulfilled by machines which do not have consciousness. So, according to theoretical parsimony, we do not have to attribute consciousness even to human beings. I wish to offer reasons why we should not doubt the existence of consciousness by showing that computational explanations can be explanations of just one part of an aspect of the human mind. Consciousness is also an explanandum rather than an explanans, and the possible reference of “ what it is like” expression. Epistemic situation regarding possible accesses to consciousness is also considered.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeNepoznato
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Brojčani podacivol. 5, br. 15, str. 433-439
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:797226
Datum objave publikacije2005
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaOtvoreni pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2021-05-26 12:01:39