How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism

Pećnjak, Davor

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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper

How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (2005), 15; 433-439. urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

Pećnjak, Davor

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APA 6th Edition

Pećnjak, D. (2005). How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5. (15), 433-439. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

MLA 8th Edition

Pećnjak, Davor. "How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 15, 2005, pp. 433-439. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

Chicago 17th Edition

Pećnjak, Davor. "How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism." Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 15 (2005): 433-439. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

Harvard

Pećnjak, D. (2005) 'How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 5(15), pp. 433-439. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226 (Accessed 19 November 2024)

Vancouver

Pećnjak D. How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2005 [cited 2024 November 19];5(15):433-439. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

IEEE

D. Pećnjak, "How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 15, pp. 433-439, 2005. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226. [Accessed: 19 November 2024]

Cite this item: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:797226

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Metadata

Title (english)	How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism
Author	Davor Pećnjak
Author's institution	Institute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field, discipline and subdiscipline	HUMANISTIC SCIENCES Philosophy
Abstract (english)	Concerning the question about consciousness, Georges Rey argues that it does not exist from the success of computational theory of human mind. Everything that such a theory requires can be fulfilled by machines which do not have consciousness. So, according to theoretical parsimony, we do not have to attribute consciousness even to human beings. I wish to offer reasons why we should not doubt the existence of consciousness by showing that computational explanations can be explanations of just one part of an aspect of the human mind. Consciousness is also an explanandum rather than an explanans, and the possible reference of “ what it is like” expression. Epistemic situation regarding possible accesses to consciousness is also considered.
Keywords (english)
Language	english
Publication type	Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication status	Published
Peer review	Unknown
Publication version	Published version
Journal title	Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Numbering	vol. 5, no. 15, pp. 433-439
p-ISSN	1333-1108
e-ISSN	1847-6139
URN:NBN	urn:nbn:hr:261:797226
Publication	2005
Type of resource	Text
Access conditions	Open access
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Created on	2021-05-26 12:01:39