prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Aristotle on deliberation and contingency
Pristup korisnicima matične ustanove
Znanstveni rad - Poglavlje u knjizi
Aristotle on deliberation and contingency
U: Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives / Grgić, Filip; Pećnjak, Davor (ur.). Cham: Springer, 2018. str. 103-115. urn:nbn:hr:261:866692
Grgić, Filip

Citirajte ovaj rad

Grgić, F. (2018). Aristotle on deliberation and contingency. U F. Grgić, (Ur.), D. Pećnjak, (Ur.), Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (str. 103-115). Cham: Springer. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Grgić, Filip. "Aristotle on deliberation and contingency." Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Ur. Filip Grgić, Ur. Davor Pećnjak, Springer, 2018, str. 103-115. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Grgić, Filip. "Aristotle on deliberation and contingency." U Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ur. Filip Grgić, ur. Davor Pećnjak, 103-115. Cham: Springer, 2018. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Grgić, F. (2018) 'Aristotle on deliberation and contingency' u Grgić, F. (ur.), Pećnjak, D. (ur.) Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives Cham: Springer, str. 103-115. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692 (Datum pristupa: 10.12.2024.)

Grgić F. Aristotle on deliberation and contingency. U: F. Grgić, ur., D. Pećnjak, ur. Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Cham: Springer; 2018. Str. 103-115. [pristupljeno 10.12.2024.] Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

F. Grgić, "Aristotle on deliberation and contingency", Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, F. Grgić i D. Pećnjak, Ur. Cham: Springer, 2018, str. 103-115. [Online] Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Za citiranje koristite ovu mrežnu adresu: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692
Prijavite se u repozitorij kako biste mogli spremiti objekt u svoju listu.
Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Aristotle on deliberation and contingency
AutorFilip Grgić
UrednikFilip Grgić
UrednikDavor Pećnjak
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
The author discusses Aristotle’s notion of deliberation and shows that it differs considerably from the model of deliberation as is common in contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility. As opposed to the contemporary model, Aristotle’s account does not require that the deliberator has any belief (or lack thereof) concerning the availability of possible courses of action. However, the action that is chosen by deliberation, before it is performed, is still contingent––i.e. such that it can both be and not be done––and up to us. Moreover, the action’s being up to us can be seen as grounded in our having rational capacities that are necessarily two-sided. This might suggest that the agent can do otherwise than she has decided by deliberation. The author argues that this is not the case: after deliberation, or after forming the relevant desire, the agent can actualize only one arm of her two-sided capacity, and hence, she cannot act differently than as decided by deliberation. If it makes sense to say that she can act differently, it is only because there may occur, in the interval between deliberation and action, some other desire which takes over a role of the decisive factor.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Poglavlje u knjizi
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov knjigeFree Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
Brojčani podacistr. 103-115
ISBN978-3-319-99294-5
p-ISSN2509-4793
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:866692
Datum objave publikacije2018
Vrsta resursaTekst
IzdavačSpringer
Mjesto izdavanjaCham
Prava pristupaInstitucijski pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2021-03-29 13:15:40