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Scientific paper - Chapter in Book
Aristotle on deliberation and contingency
In: Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives / Grgić, Filip; Pećnjak, Davor (Ed.). Cham: Springer, 2018. pp. 103-115. urn:nbn:hr:261:866692
Grgić, Filip

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Grgić, F. (2018). Aristotle on deliberation and contingency. In F. Grgić, (Ed.), D. Pećnjak, (Ed.), Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 103-115). Cham: Springer. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Grgić, Filip. "Aristotle on deliberation and contingency." Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Filip Grgić, edited by Davor Pećnjak, Springer, 2018, pp. 103-115. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Grgić, Filip. "Aristotle on deliberation and contingency." In Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Filip Grgić, edited by Davor Pećnjak, 103-115. Cham: Springer, 2018. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

Grgić, F. (2018) 'Aristotle on deliberation and contingency' in Grgić, F. (ed.), Pećnjak, D. (ed.) Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives Cham: Springer, pp. 103-115. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692 (Accessed 13 July 2024)

Grgić F. Aristotle on deliberation and contingency. In: F. Grgić, ed., D. Pećnjak, ed. Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Cham: Springer; 2018. Pp. 103-115. [cited 2024 July 13] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

F. Grgić, "Aristotle on deliberation and contingency", Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, F. Grgić and D. Pećnjak, Eds. Cham: Springer, 2018, pp. 103-115. [Online] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:866692

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Metadata
Title (english)Aristotle on deliberation and contingency
AuthorFilip Grgić
EditorFilip Grgić
EditorDavor Pećnjak
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
The author discusses Aristotle’s notion of deliberation and shows that it differs considerably from the model of deliberation as is common in contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility. As opposed to the contemporary model, Aristotle’s account does not require that the deliberator has any belief (or lack thereof) concerning the availability of possible courses of action. However, the action that is chosen by deliberation, before it is performed, is still contingent––i.e. such that it can both be and not be done––and up to us. Moreover, the action’s being up to us can be seen as grounded in our having rational capacities that are necessarily two-sided. This might suggest that the agent can do otherwise than she has decided by deliberation. The author argues that this is not the case: after deliberation, or after forming the relevant desire, the agent can actualize only one arm of her two-sided capacity, and hence, she cannot act differently than as decided by deliberation. If it makes sense to say that she can act differently, it is only because there may occur, in the interval between deliberation and action, some other desire which takes over a role of the decisive factor.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Chapter in Book
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review
Publication versionPublished version
Book titleFree Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
Numberingpp. 103-115
ISBN978-3-319-99294-5
p-ISSN2509-4793
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:866692
Publication2018
Type of resourceText
PublisherSpringer
Publishing placeCham
Access conditionsInstitutional access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2021-03-29 13:15:40