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Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 4 (1999); 19-40. urn:nbn:hr:261:493702
Grgić, Filip

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Grgić, F. (1999). Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 4., 19-40. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

Grgić, Filip. "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, vol. 4, 1999, str. 19-40. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

Grgić, Filip. "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 4 (1999): 19-40. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

Grgić, F. (1999) 'Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge', Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 4, str. 19-40. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702 (Datum pristupa: 16.11.2024.)

Grgić F. Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter [Internet]. 1999. [pristupljeno 16.11.2024.];4:19-40. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

F. Grgić, "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge", Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, vol. 4, str. 19-40, 1999. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702. [Citirano: 16.11.2024.]

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Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge
AutorFilip Grgić
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called and the This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a manner in which Meno's paradox can be generalized. This implies that they cannot be resolved by the same argument. It is then argued that the theory of recollection, as presented in Socrates' experiment with the slave, cannot resolve Meno's paradox, its target being only the eristic argument. Only the hypothetical method of inquiry is the effective answer to Meno's paradox. Finally, this essay contends that, contrary to what the text might suggest, Socrates, by introducing the hypothetical method, does not abandon his principle that knowing what something is precedes knowing what something is like.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeNepoznato
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaBochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter
Brojčani podacivol. 4, str. 19-40
p-ISSN1384-6663
e-ISSN1569-9684
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:493702
Datum objave publikacije1999
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaInstitucijski pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2021-03-26 14:39:09