prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge
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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 4 (1999); 19-40. urn:nbn:hr:261:493702
Grgić, Filip

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Grgić, F. (1999). Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 4., 19-40. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

Grgić, Filip. "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, vol. 4, 1999, pp. 19-40. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

Grgić, Filip. "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 4 (1999): 19-40. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

Grgić, F. (1999) 'Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge', Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 4, pp. 19-40. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702 (Accessed 19 April 2024)

Grgić F. Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter [Internet]. 1999 [cited 2024 April 19];4:19-40. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702

F. Grgić, "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge", Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, vol. 4, pp. 19-40, 1999. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:493702. [Accessed: 19 April 2024]

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Metadata
Title (english)Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge
AuthorFilip Grgić
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called and the This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a manner in which Meno's paradox can be generalized. This implies that they cannot be resolved by the same argument. It is then argued that the theory of recollection, as presented in Socrates' experiment with the slave, cannot resolve Meno's paradox, its target being only the eristic argument. Only the hypothetical method of inquiry is the effective answer to Meno's paradox. Finally, this essay contends that, contrary to what the text might suggest, Socrates, by introducing the hypothetical method, does not abandon his principle that knowing what something is precedes knowing what something is like.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewUnknown
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleBochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter
Numberingvol. 4, pp. 19-40
p-ISSN1384-6663
e-ISSN1569-9684
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:493702
Publication1999
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsInstitutional access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2021-03-26 14:39:09