Abstract (english) | In three chapters of »Peripatetic Investigations« by Matija Frkić »On cognizable for man; On the threefold division of science; On the first thing cognized; (De cognoscibilibus ab homine; De scientarium divisione tripartia; De primo cognito) the question De cognition and science were discussed separately.
In the chapter: »On cognizable for man« Frkić debated the limits in principle to natural Cognition and drew the conclusion that according to peripatetic principles human cognition was limited because the human mind necessarily based itself on the objects of sense perception.
This treatise, as well as the conclusion drawn from it, was aimed against any absolutization of peripatetic philosophy as the only and ultimate truth, as well as against the hypothesis of two verities. The motivation and impetus for the discussion could be seen in Frkić's antithesis against the Renaissance aspirations to harmonize Christianity and Neo-Platonism, and in his opposition to the Renaissance interpretations of Aristotelian philosophy.
The treatise »On the threefold division of knowledge« Frkić insisted on the triple division, that is, he wanted to prove the independence and characteristicness of creative science with regard to its subject-matter and to correlative cognitive acts.
With regard to Frkić's, emphasis on the scientific character of theoretical, practical, and poietic-creative science, and with regard to his hypnothesis on important distinction between the subjects and creative-poietic and practical sciences, it seems that Frkić's reflections should be interpreted in the scope of the new Renaissance-humanistic interest in grammer, retoric, poetry - scientia litterarum, poietic-creative science, as well as in ethics, political philosophy and law-practical science.
In conformity with the Renaissance tendencies Frkić confirmed the scientific character of poietic-creative and practical sciences, but at the same time he claimed, in the peripatetic tradition, a distinction of their subject matters – and that means in the peripatetic terminology that the subjects of theoretical, practical and poietic-creative suences have different dignities.
Of Frkić's three treatises which deal with the problem. of cognition and science the one »On the first thing cognized.« is the most extensive, but at the same time, it abounds in repetitions. The topic of this treatise is, as can be seen from the title, the first• cognition, that is, what is perceived first, before anything else, with regard. to the sequence of time. To solve this problem Frkić exponded his peripatetic conception of the universal cognitive process, discussing not only the time sequence of cognition, but the problem of the relation between sense-perceptive and intellectual cognition as well.
In conformity with peripatetic tradition Frkić claimed the temporal priority of sense perception, but, also the formal independence, the autonomy .of intellectual cognition as against sense perception.
This treatise of Frkić's should be seen in the framework of Renaissance discussions on the advantages of Platonic or of peripatetic philosophy as well as in the framework of the internal disagreements of the peripatetics of that time. Opposite to Alexandrian naturalistic interpretations of Aristotel, Frkić wanted too prove the formal independence of intellectual cognition upon perception (in conformity with the principles of peripatetic philosophy), while in an antithesis to Platonism he insisted on the factual-temporal sequence from perception to intellectual cognition. This consideration »On the first thing perceived« sought, as did Vestigationes peripateticae in its entirety, to prove again the value and truth of peripatetic philosophy based on its compatibility with Christianty. But tis motivation did not put him below the level of the contemporary philosophical - peripatetic discussions (very well known to Frkić). The treatise in fact presents, without regard to the veriety of theses and doctrines in it, a shared horizon and criterion in practically all Renaissance discussions on Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies. |