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Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 15 (2015), 1 (43); 17-39. urn:nbn:hr:261:952481
Dožudić, Dušan

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Dožudić, D. (2015). Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 15. (1 (43)), 17-39. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:952481

Dožudić, Dušan. "Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 15, br. 1 (43), 2015, str. 17-39. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:952481

Dožudić, Dušan. "Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class." Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15, br. 1 (43) (2015): 17-39. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:952481

Dožudić, D. (2015) 'Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 15(1 (43)), str. 17-39. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:952481 (Datum pristupa: 20.04.2024.)

Dožudić D. Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2015. [pristupljeno 20.04.2024.];15(1 (43)):17-39. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:952481

D. Dožudić, "Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 15, br. 1 (43), str. 17-39, 2015. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:952481. [Citirano: 20.04.2024.]

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Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Resisting the Restriction of the Propositional Attitude Class
AutorDušan Dožudić
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
It is a standard view among philosophers that an attitude is propositional if a that clause could represent its content. One way of challenging this view is to argue that attitudes whose content can be represented in that way have categorically different content. A number of authors adopted such a strategy and imposed various restrictions on the propositional attitude class. In this paper, I will argue that such restrictions are not tenable because the arguments that are used to support them turn against such restrictions as well. As a consequence, if one cannot adequately deal with these arguments from the perspective of the standard view, one is forced to discard generally the propositionality of attitudes, perhaps even their relational nature. I will consider a strategy for resolving this challenge in favour of the standard view.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Brojčani podacivol. 15, br. 1 (43), str. 17-39
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:952481
Datum objave publikacije2015
URL dokumentahttps://hrcak.srce.hr/cjp?lang=en
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaOtvoreni pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2021-03-23 12:39:08