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Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen / Comptes rendus de lecture

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Pirner-Pareschi, Thomas Ricklin**
(Hrsg.)

Sol et homo

**Mensch und Natur in der
Renaissance. Festschrift zum
70. Geburtstag für Eckhard Keßler**

Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München
2008

This lengthy book is a collection of articles in honor of prof. dr. Eckhard Keßler. E. Keßler finished practically all his *cursum honorum* at the University of Munich: in 1967 he was promoted to *doctor philosophiae* in philosophy, Latin and Greek, and in 1975 he habilitated in philosophy and intellectual history of humanism (*Geistesgeschichte des Humanismus*) at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. From 1964 till 2005 E. Keßler was also active as teacher at the same university, more precisely at the “Seminary for renaissance intellectual history and philosophy” (“Seminar für Geistesgeschichte und Philosophie der Renaissance”). He was also director of this institution (founded as Italian Center for humanist and philosophical studies in 1948 and initially directed by E. Grassi) from 1997–2004. E. Keßler published 23 books either as author or an editor, and more than 70 articles (the complete Keßler’s bibliography till 2005 can be found at <http://www.phil-hum-ren.uni-muenchen.de/php/Kessler/PublEK01.htm>). Almost all of his books and articles deal with Renaissance and early Modern Age subjects.

The book is divided into three sections: I. “Humanism” (7 contributions); II. “University Philosophy” (“Universitäre Philosophie” 8 contributions); III. “Extra-University Philosophy” (“Außeruniversitäre Philosophie”, 11 contributions).

The first part (“Humanism”) is composed of the following contributions:

1. C. Vasoli, “Burckhardt in Italia, i ‘secoli bui’ e il mito dei ‘precursori’ del Rinascimento”. The text is focused on the reception of Burckhardt’s globally famous *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* in Italy. This book played a special, “national” role in Italy in the 19th century, in which time the modern Italian nation has been forming itself. In order to show how Burckhardt’s book was received and perceived in Italy Vasoli brings as witness Adolfo Bartoli, a 19th century *letterato* and a professor of Italian literature at the prestigious department of the Florentine University. Vasoli offers a hermeneutic analysis of how Bartoli was influenced by Burckhardt while composing his *I precursori del Rinascimento*: Burckhardt’s concept of Renaissance became for Bartoli a measure with which one should measure all the aspects of medieval society and literature as anticipation of “rediscovery of man and nature”. In this text Vasoli puts a special emphasis on literary production of the Middle Ages and Renaissance which were of special interest to Bartoli too. It is an interesting hermeneutical contribution, almost a tria-logue between Vasoli, Bartoli and Burckhard on the significance of the concept of Renaissance as an inspiration to interpret a civilization at its peak of creativity.
2. Th. Ricklin, “Einige vor allem biographische Hinweise zu Petrarca und seinem Freund Boccaccio angesichts von Plato und Homer”. The text consists of two not too tightly connected parts: in the first part Ricklin analyses mostly literary sources of Petrarch as “platonico poeta” and its meaning, with an argument that Petrarch earned this title more by his opposition to Aristotle and Aristotelianism than his clearly formulated Platonism. It is a famous story that Petrarch, who owned a precious Greek manuscript of Plato’s texts, never fulfilled his dream to learn Greek and Ricklin opens his contribution with this remark. In this part Ricklin pays a lot of attention to sensitiveness of Petrarch’s

- position as a critic of Aristotle: by criticizing Aristotle he entered into a “conflict” with Dante too, for whom Aristotle was “maestro di color che sanno”. In the second part Ricklin analyses the relationship between Boccaccio and Petrarch in regard to Homer. Ricklin’s supposition is that Boccaccio, who published a *Vita Homeri* (as a part of his *Esposizioni sopra la Comedia di Dante*) in 1374, must have gathered material for this work as early as 1360 and shared it with Petrarch in a form of a letter, to which Petrarch answered with a *Responsio ad epistolam magnam multaue continentem sub Homeri poete missam nomine* [...] which is dated in late 1360. For Petrarch Homer is “bigger and more sublime than the philosopher”, whereas it is not clear which philosopher Petrarch had in mind – Ricklin argues it must be Plato. In their relationships towards Homer and Plato, both Petrarch and Boccaccio were (almost intuitive, in lack of more detailed knowledge of Plato and Homer) anticipators of 15th century Platonism, concludes Ricklin: it was Ficino who relatively reluctantly – a century later – integrated Homer among the “legitimi poetae” after having translated the complete works of Plato.
3. F. M. Zini, “Sprache und Argumentation in Lorenzo Valla”. The main question is which conditions an argumentation must meet in order to be plausible according to L. Valla. Zini argues that language, to Valla, has a constitutive and not expressive function. By recognizing individual and historical characteristics of a language, Valla wanted to determine a universal background which makes it possible to understand a discourse composed in a different language and in different times. The object of rhetoric and dialectic is a natural process of argumentation that relates itself to accidental properties. In his approach Valla took both from Aristotle’s concept of contradiction as well as Cicero’s *Topic*. This contribution of Zini goes into depth and analyses the often repeated (and unclear) idea of Valla as a defender of rhetoric reduced to the notion of *eloquentia*, *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* (of ancient authors). Zini shows that Valla’s concept is more elaborated than “merely rhetorical”, that it is rooted in medieval logical investigations and that Valla must have been influenced by Boethius. Moreover Zini shows that Valla applied his theory in practice of his writings.
 4. M. Pade, “Niccolò Perotti and the *ars traducendi*”. The article is divided into several sections (from “Life of Perotti” till the very sketchy “Early Renaissance theory of translation”). In this article the author tries to understand Bessarion’s secretary Perotti’s approach to texts of classical Greek authors. Perotti left no theoretical script containing his ideas of how he approached a text, so by comparing his methodological remarks with his practice Pade concludes how to place his work in the story of humanist translation. The most interesting part is when Pade looks at “mistakes” in Perotti’s translation: interpolations, grammatical changes and semantic changes: finally she argues that what was labeled as imprecision in translation by some earlier scholars is actually Perotti’s conscious wish to render the original not only in correct and idiomatic Latin, but also to translate it into the literary conventions of 15th century Italian humanist culture.
 5. M. Roick, “Der sichere Hafen und die Stürme des Lebens. Autobiographie als philosophisches Argument in Giovanni Pontanos *De prudentia*”. In this text the author argues that autobiographical style of writing is not just a rhetorical ornament or a historical report, but serves as a philosophical argument in context of ethics. The article is in a certain way an exemplification (and continuation) of thoughts about the role of autobiography in philosophy as expressed by E. Kefler in his text “Autobiographie als philosophische Argument? [...]” (*Studia humanitatis Ernesto Grassi zum 70. Geburtstag*, München, 1973): Kefler (as adopted by Roick) explains Cicero’s thesis that the author – in order to be plausible – should himself seem and really be a good man, a practical philosopher therefore cannot avoid self-references as a part of its task in communicative processes. Roick particularly analyses Pontano’s *De prudentia* I.31 in which Pontano describes his political and private activities, justifying both contemplative and active life as two parts of perfect life. In this way autobiography presents an important argument for a philosopher when discussing happy life.
 6. G. Piaia, “‘Ars praedicandi’ e messaggi politici in Cornelio Musso (1511–1574)”. His considerable culture and exceptional gifts of eloquence turned a humble and unknown minor conventual friar Cornelio into one of the most prominent catholic orators of his times. In his speeches he concentrated primarily to the following, mutually connected, topics: the figure and the role of the sovereign, justice and laws, fatherland and war. The common ground

connecting these topics is represented by relationship between ecclesiastical and civil government. Musso's position, according to Piaia, is moderately theocratic, inspired by the principle of hierarchical subordination and distribution of tasks among the laymen and clerics within Christianity. Piaia analyses several homilies in order to show this position represented by Musso.

7. D. Thouard, "Bossuet ou la philosophie de l'histoire comme metacritique". In his contribution Thouard analyses the position of Bossuet as a proponent of orthodoxy in its particular form of the traditional authority in French church in the times of fight against multiplication of heresies. It was not just Protestantism that Bossuet was against, but all forms of intellectual and religious areas which were contrary to his vision of true religion: from "profane literature" to "mysteries" and "philosophy". By analyzing different aspects of Bossuet's work (logic and rhetoric, history and relationship to tradition), Thouard tries to understand (if not justify) the need of a dogmatism in the times of crises.

The second part ("Universitäre Philosophie") consists of the following contributions:

1. D. A. Di Liscia and S. Ebbesmeyer, "Gaetano da Thienes, *Quaestio de perpetuitate intellectus*". This lengthy contribution analyses the problem of the perpetuity of the soul as understood by the early Renaissance logician from Padua, G. da Thiene (1387–1465). The contribution is a thorough analysis of the related text, *Quaestio de perpetuitate intellectus*, which is given in a critical edition in the appendix to the contribution. The contribution itself analyses the textual and contextual problems. The authors also offer a brief overview of the position of this *quaestio* in the tradition of this problem, as well as particular position of Gaetano within the tradition of *calculatores* and their specific approach to the problem of the perpetuity of the soul. The important conclusion of this contribution is that Gaetano reached for the Neoplatonist concept of the soul as the middle and intermediary from instead of overtaking Aristotelian form/matter scheme, which can hardly be put in concord with the Christian doctrine of the eternity of the soul. This is a detailed and valuable contribution offering a thorough analysis of a "new" text, supported here by all proper *apparati*.
2. L. Giard, "Le débat su la certitude des mathématiques à Padoue (1540–1560)".

The author analyzes how the transformation of Aristotelianism in the 16th century influenced particular mathematical considerations. Mathematicians of the 16th century were not a homogeneous social group and the problems they were dealing with were heterogeneous: ones were looking for a method in order to coherently organize practical results; the others tried to separate their endeavors from *philosophia naturalis*, i.e. to establish their particular domain, their particular objects and methods. This diversity within the world of Aristotelianism was provoked by "silences" and "ambiguities" in the texts of Aristotle, in which one cannot find a systematic discussion of mathematics. Giard shows how humanism influenced the Aristotelian understanding of mathematics in Padua, concentrating on Alessandro Piccolomini, Francesco Barozzi and Pietro Catena. All of those three mathematicians used the same textual sources (Aristotle, Euclid and Proclus), but interpreted them in different ways. Giard offers a cursory but solid and insightful analysis of the three mathematicians and by pointing to their similarities and differences isolates the essence of the change within the world of mathematics in the 16th century as well as its relationship to Aristotelianism.

3. M. Kahle, "Samuel Quiccheberg 'Disputatio Medica Ingelstadij'". In her contribution Kahle analyses a *disputation* from 1553 which Quiccheberg must have had at the medical faculty of the University of Ingolstadt. After an introduction full of historical references about Quiccheberg's life and general explanation of *disputations* in German universities during Renaissance, Kahle ends with some suppositions about position and function of Quiccheberg's *disputatio*. As a reader of Kahle's text, at the end I am left with much more knowledge about *circumstances* in which this *Disputatio* must have been written, than about the content and significance of Quiccheberg's text.
4. A. Poppi, "Girolamo Girelli e Iacopo Zabarella sul proemi della *Fisica* di Aristotele (*Phys. I, 1, 184a 10-184b 14*)". It is the famous beginning of *Physics* in which Aristotle puts forward his main assumptions that every form of scientific knowledge can be reached only from knowledge of the principles or first causes till the simplest elements: this method, according to Aristotle, should be applied to the science of nature as well. These initial chapters of the *Physics* have raised many interpretative variations from Hellenistic period till

- Renaissance: the most famous are Alexander of Aphrodisias' in Antiquity, in Averroes' in Middle Ages and Zabarella's in Renaissance. Poppi contrasts the interpretation of Zabarella with the one of Girelli, a less famous Franciscan teacher of Scotist theology at the University of Padua who composed a commentary on *Physics* I in 1553, i.e. some 50 years before Zabarella's. Poppi focuses on five crucial moments in Aristotle's text and exposes how Girelli and Zabarella analyzed those moments. However interesting and well formulated analyses of each particular philosopher in this text were, to me it was not all too clear which connection Poppi sees between Girelli and Zabarella and what really the purpose of the comparison is. In his conclusion Poppi states that Zabarella's commentary is theoretically and philologically superior to Girelli's, but without realizing the connection between the two it is difficult not to see this comparison as somehow arbitrary.
5. J. S. Freedman, "An Extraordinary Broad-sheet on Natural Philosophy: The *Theatrum universitatis rerum* (1557) by Christophorus Mylaeus". It is the longest single contribution in the whole collection, with all *appendices* it stretches along 74 pages. Mylaeus published a broadsheet, bearing the title *Theatre of the Universe of Thing* in the year 1557 and it consists of an extensive series of dichotomous charts pertaining principally to the subject matter of natural philosophy. The special value of this contribution lays in the fact that there is only one existing copy of this work and as such is relatively unknown and unreachable. Moreover Mylaeus is almost completely neglected a thinker: in his thorough bibliography Freedman lists only 7 entries pertaining to Mylaeus (including encyclopaedic ones like Jöcher). This contribution consists of a clear presentation of Mylaeus' life and a very detailed exposition of the content of the broadsheet. In *appendices* Freedman schematically presents the whole *Theatrum universitatis rerum*, pages A-O, which in lack of any other copy might be understood as a critical edition of the text.
 6. S. Kusukawa, "The Prices of Some Sixteenth-Century Natural Philosophy Text-books". This is a refreshing and valuable contribution dealing with a topic often neglected by modern readers: how much the Renaissance books cost, i.e. who could afford to have them. The first part of the article the author focuses on prizes of books in Germany and Basel, comparing the price of the book with an average income of a university teacher at that time. The second part of the article focuses on the prizes of books among Cambridge booksellers (notably G. Godfrey, N. Pilgrim, and J. Denys). The text is very detailed, sometimes perhaps even too detailed in giving information such as cost of printing paper, cost of binding, cost of privilege and the scribe for making a fair copy etc.
 7. H. Mikkeli, "Why Bother with Methods? The Contexts of Late 16th-century Paduan Discussions on Method: Pietro Pomponazzi at Padua". This contribution focuses on one of the most important topics of the Renaissance philosophy, namely the problem of change of paradigm during Renaissance which finally led to the emergence of modern science. Mikkeli's focus is set on J. Zabarella and the variations within Aristotelianism. Aristotelian natural philosophy had to free itself from the chains of metaphysics; but it had also to meet the empirical challenge set by the practical disciplines and the mechanical arts, like medicine. Mikkeli briefly shows that Zabarella tried to present an independent Aristotelian natural philosophy based on a strict demonstrative method, whereas, on the other hand, the idea of science as power, i.e. not just a speculative enterprise, has usually been connected with philosophers like Frances Bacon. The strength of this contribution lies primarily in a very dense and clear exposition of this exquisitely difficult problem, rather than in promulgating some new ideas.
 8. J. B. Elpert, "Kein Bruder soll sich anmassen, ein eigentliches Studium zu verfolgen. Die Kapuziner und die Philosophie – ein Streifzug durch die intellektuelle, philosophische Entwicklung des Kapuzinerordens im 16. und frühen 17. Jahrhundert". This more than 40 pages long contribution tries to open a new area of research: the intellectual contribution of the Capuchin order in the 16th and 17th century. It is in a certain way a ground breaking endeavor because the Capuchins have had a reputation of paying little attention to intellectual excellence. The author admits that in the beginning of the order there were indeed few intellectuals, but later in their development they produced quite a number of outstanding intellectuals. The author analyses several of those figures, giving an overview over about each of them, dedicating to some just a half of a page, to others more than eleven. He mentions the following Capuchins: Franz Titelmans von Hasselt, Bernharding von

Asti, Bernhardin von Montolmo, Hieronymus von Montefiore, Hieronymus von Pistoia, Yves de Paris, Valerian Magni, Dionysius von Werl, and Louis von Dôle.

The third part of the Festschrift is entitled “Außeruniversitäre Philosophie” and it opens with the article by:

1. Ch. H. Lohr, “Chaos nach Ramon Lull und Nikolaus von Cusa”. The main goal of the article is to show the connection between Lull and Cusanus, according to the “working hypothesis” that within the framework of a practical paradigm the novelties which can be found in Cusanus’ second book of the *De docta ignorantia* are also present in Lull’s *Ars magna*. The crucial moment of Lohr’s analysis is the concept of Chaos – Lohr first analyses the specific meaning of this term in Lull (which is, as he claims, “eine intentionale Wirklichkeit – eine reale, aber nicht existierende Wirklichkeit, die vor der Welt als die Möglichkeit der Dinge gewesen ist”). This Lullian concept of the “Chaos” as *possibilitas rerum* Lohr compares with Cusanus’ concept of *maximum contractum*. In this interpretation Lohr opposes the traditional view according to which it was Augustine (via Thierry von Chartres) that influenced Cusanus in this respect. Lohr finishes his text with a suggestion: should the title *De docta ignorantia* be translated as “Über das konjektuelle Wissen der Künste”? Quite a serious provocation to anyone how has ever poked his nose into this intricate book.
2. M. J. B. Allen, “Sending Archedemus: Ficino, Plato’s Second Letter, and its Four Epistolary Mysteries”. In his contribution Allen analyses Ficino’s introduction for his translation of Plato’s *Second Letter*. In this introduction, according to Allen, Ficino discussed four distinct problems (which Allen, after Ficino, calls “mysteries” or “enigmas”) as they are to be found in (pseudo)Plato’s *Second Letter*. The first one is quite famous: it concerns the complementary relationship of wisdom, i.e. *vita contemplativa*, and of power, i.e. *vita activa*, or, the interdependence of the philosopher and the ruler. Allen very densely and for me not all too clearly explains Ficino’s interpretation of Plato’s passage as surpassing the binary Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and act and adopting two fundamental Neoplatonic triads: the triad of procession, rapture and return, and that of being, life, and intellect. The second “mystery” Ficino finds in Plato’s words that the most slavish men have no regard for their posthumous reputations, whereas the most upright do the opposite. Ficino has again Neoplatonized his text: at the heart of this second mystery is the notion of virtue and its radiance. This is based on Augustinian metaphysics that distinguishes between the radiance of pure light in itself and the splendor of that light as it is seen by others. According to Ficino, only a truly Christian hermeneut would be in a position to interpret the most mystical statements of Plato. The third mystery is the “most sublime” mystery about the nature of “the First”. The mystery Ficino discovers here is theological and metaphysical again: he takes the famous enigma about the First principle and transforms it into a Plotinian series of emanation of the One into Mind and then into Soul. The fourth mystery deals with our perception of divine matters: it is the mystery of how we can best approach the mysteries themselves. Ficino solves this “mystery” so that we should aspire not to intellectual understanding but to intellectual activity that is purgative (and here Ficino has Socrates as a model), and that leads ultimately to a kind of intellectual quiescence, to the trans-intellectual state of “faith” and “sacred silence” which is “more ancient” than doctrine. Allen closes his analysis by hermeneutical observations about Ficino’s methodology: Ficino’s account of Plato’s *Second Letter* raises a number of interpretative questions that are central for an understanding of his methodology and metaphysics.
3. P. R. Blum, “On Popular Platonism: Giovanni Pico with Elia del Medigo against Marsilio Ficino”. In this contribution Blum presents the controversy between Ficino and his fellow Platonist Pico. According to P. R. Blum, Pico used his interpretation of the poem written by Girolamo Benivieni which itself condenses Ficino’s interpretation of Plato’s *Symposium* to mark his distance from Ficinian Platonism. Pico’s main concern was, so P. R. Blum, to correct or divert Ficino’s Platonism in a way that Christian truth would not suffer harm from ancient, pre-Christian, and unchristian philosophizing. Pico’s project in his most prolific year (1486) was “the hazardous project” to set up a new style of philosophizing and a new approach to Christian and non-Christian sources. To support his thesis P. R. Blum enters into quite complicated analyses of Pico’s relationship with his teacher, Elia del Medigo, in discussing the myth of Caelus-Saturnus-Jupiter. From Pico’s interpretation it becomes obvious that the main point of divergence between

- Ficino's and Pico's Platonism is that Pico understood that Ficino's model of emanation may be understood as a gradual decay of power and dignity, which was at odds with Pico's Averroism (according to P. R. Blum). Pico's aim was to show that Platonism was not conducive to rationalize Christian faith; Pico open the question of how far one can go in Christianizing Plato, as Ficino does. Plato can be interpreted in a Christian way, but it cannot be done as Ficino did it: it takes an additional hermeneutic effort to Christianize Platonism. P. R. Blum gives some hints of how this "additional hermeneutical effort" might be done by Pico and I can only wish Blum wrote a bit more on that.
4. E. Blum, "Selbstbildnis des Denkers als Philosoph: Reflexionen zum philosophischen Selbstportrait". This is another contribution (see M. Roick's above) that focuses on the role of autobiography in the context of philosophical writing. E. Blum's text is different than the rest of the texts in this collection. It is written with more literary than philosophical pretension: it gives a very personal (and post-modern) understanding of the role of autobiography among philosophers – it is not strictly focused on the Renaissance period for the allusions and innuendoes run across millennia: from Socrates to Umberto Eco. And the themes dealt with in this contribution are manifold: the significance of mirror, the meaning of the "gnothi sauton", physiognomy, the four characters, etc. The contribution ends with a personal self-description of the author.
 5. H. C. Kuhn, "Von den Hexenverfolgungen zu Bacon'scher Wissenschaft: Kontinuitäten der Magie in der Renaissance". The main goal of this contribution is to show that in the Renaissance there was a number of people, who, while they were considered (by others as well as by themselves) to be engaged in doing "magic", were in fact doing nothing much different than what Baconian scientist was supposed to do or what even today's engineers or natural scientist are doing. What they were doing is the following: with their "experiments" and "interventions" they influenced natural events and procedures, and in this way produced "great and marvelous works for the benefit of men". Kuhn's text is logically divided into two parts: in the first part Kuhn seeks to separate magic from adjacent disciplines like astrology, chemistry and Kabbalah and, then to define what magic in Renaissance was. The sources he uses are indeed diverse: from Rowling's *Harry Potter* to H. Kramer's *Malleus malificarum* and Ficino's *De vita*. In the second part he uses the examples of two of those "proto-scientists", Agrippa von Nettesheim and G. B. Della Porta, to show that the experiments and procedures they used in their "magic" are quite close to Baconian description of a scientist.
 6. P. M. Schenkel, "Mystiker und Mathematiker. Zur eigenen Lebensbeschreibung 'Girolamo Caradno'". This contribution is divided into two parts. The first part is an intellectual biography of G. Cardano based on his own autobiography: many quotes from the German translation of Cardano's book are interrupted with Schenkel's commentaries and suggestions. The second part of this contribution, entitled "Cardano und der *splendor*" and subtitled "A half-scientific postscript" ("Eine halbwissenschaftliche Nachschrift") is Schenkel's more academic approach to explain Cardano's *Vita propria*. The leitmotif of Schenkel's interpretation is the concept of *splendor*, which appears four times in Cardano's autobiography and which bears a lot of significance for his life and scientific development. Schenkel's understanding of this concept is the following. The Aristotelian model of science, which is still dominant in the 16th century, does not offer much room for explaining new knowledge: it is an efficient method to order already acquired knowledge and explain the processes of combining possessed knowledge, but it is unclear how *new* knowledge comes about. According to Schenkel, Cardano tried to incorporate his notion of *splendor* into the Aristotelian model of science in order to explain exactly that which was, according to Cardano, lacunose in Aristotle's text. Is the Platonic concept of the "spark of the soul" somehow in the back of Cardano's mind while he writes about *splendor*? Schenkel is silent about it.
 7. E. Banić-Pajnić, "Die 'pia philosophia' bei Nikolaus von Kues, Marsilio Ficino und Frane Petrić/Patrizi". In her contribution Banić-Pajnić starts from stressing importance of *pia philosophia* for Renaissance philosophy by claiming that *pia philosophia* presents the one of the most fundamental tenets of Renaissance Neoplatonism as well as Renaissance philosophy in general. The text is divided into three parts in a non-chronological order: in the first part the author seeks to grasp the concept of *pia philosophia* in M. Ficino, the second part is dedicated to the *pia philosophia* of F. Petrić, whereas the last part belongs to

N. Cusanus. All three parts are entitled with the relevant name of the philosopher discussed and the appendix “und die ‘pia philosophia’”. For Ficino *pia philosophia* presents a vicinity of philosophy and religion (philosophy here meaning Neoplatonic philosophy), already present in the *prisca theologia*. What does this vicinity actually mean? Besides the traditional Neoplatonic tenet about two paths which lead to the cognizance of God, this closeness of religion and philosophy makes God as truth also an object of philosophy. This is obviously no divergence from the Neoplatonic tradition and in consequence Banić-Panić concludes that actually the main contribution of Ficino is revitalization and combination of Platonism (i.e. interpretations of original texts of Plato), Christianity and Hermetic tradition, which led to understanding Plato as *adumbratio Christi*, i.e. the anticipator of some of the most important moments of Christianity. The main motif of Ficino was, according to the author, a revitalization of faith, i.e. of a new faith, a philosophical faith. In Petrić, on the other hand, there is a more radical interpretation of the *pia philosophia*. Similarly to Ficino, Petrić’s motivation is lack of true religiosity, which, according to Petrić, is consequence of the dominance of Aristotelianism. Therefore Petrić is in agreement with Ficino about closeness of ancient non-Christian (Platonic, Neoplatonic and Hermetic) texts and Christian doctrine, but his radical novelty is in his position that the Hermetic and Chaldaic texts present the Christian doctrine even clearer than books of Moses (especially the doctrine about trinity, which was also the object of Ficino’s arguments). Petrić wants to show that there is a philosophy which can have trinity as an argumentative object and which can reach it with its specific instruments. The author closes her exposition by enumerating similarities and differences between Ficino’s and Petrić’s understanding of the *pia philosophia*. The last part of her text Banić-Pajnić opens with the hypothesis that Cusanus could be understood as the first Renaissance philosopher who had a theoretical approach to the *pia philosophia* (despite the fact that this phrase is nowhere to be found in his texts). In order to show Cusanus’ position, Banić-Pajnić brings a relatively long and scrutinous analysis of the *De docta ignorantia*. Finally she concludes that in order to justly assess Cusanus’ position towards the *pia philosophia* he has to be compared to other Renaissance philosophers: despite some obvious differences (i.e. that for Cu-

sanus the specifically Christian doctrines are more accentuated than typically philosophical moments), there is something in common between Cusanus and later Renaissance philosophers: it is their attempt to redefine the relationship between theology and philosophy. It is a philosophico-theological synthesis. In the end Banić-Pajnić concludes that although Cusanus does not mention the phrase ‘pia philosophia’, the fundamental concepts of the *pia philosophia*, which will later be developed by Ficino and Petrić, are already present in Cusanus’ texts. Banić-Pajnić text is one of the clearest and most systematic texts in this book.

8. M. Muslow, “Ein unbekanntes Gespräch Telesios. Senualismus, Aristoteleskritik und Theorie des Lichts in der Spätrenaissance”. Muslow’s contribution opens with a brief analysis of Telesio’s life and his general intellectual position: we learn that Telesio criticized Aristotle having in mind a “kontextfreien, überhistorischen [...] Neuanfang”. What Muslow wants to accomplish in this text is actually to reconstruct a “dialogue” between Telesio and his most famous pupil, A. Persio. In his text Muslow brings the complete transcript of Persio’s unpublished manuscript, written probably between 1587 and 1590, under the title *De natura ignis et caloris*. This text is a sort of an answer to Persio’s edition and publication of late Telesio’s collection of text under the title *Varii de naturalibus rebus libelli*. The whole Persio’s text and Muslow’s translation comprise six and a half pages. According to Muslow, this text, written as a dialogue, presents the exchange of opinions between Telesio and Persio around year 1570. The personae of the dialogue are Telesio, Quinzio Buongiovanni who presents a hard core Aristotelian. Persio himself has only one but dramatically quite effective intervention. The whole dialogue is about differences between Aristotelian and Telesio’s concept of light, fire and heat – basically about the Sun, which in Renaissance was much used metaphor and symbol, uniting all three natural forces. In Muslow’s text there follows a thorough and sharp analysis of this short dialogue: both about the content of the text as well as about circumstances which lead to its creation. In the third part of the text Muslow offers an exposition of problems about philosophical understanding of light and heat in Renaissance. Muslow’s text is so full with information and contextual connections that it would make no sense to reproduce it here.

9. I. Schütze, “Zur Wahrnehmungstheorie der Musik bei René Descartes”. In this text the author analyzes two texts of Descartes: the later *Traité de l’homme* and the earlier *Compendium musicae*. In the former text Descartes defends the idea of human body as a machine: this is further the ground for a mechanistic understanding. According to Descartes’ explanation auditory perception is basically dualistic, both physical and mental – the whole explanation is far too intricate to be reproduced here: important is to mention that one of the characteristics of the development of the modern science is that natural phenomena were explained and quantified ever more often by the means of mechanical models. Descartes’ explanation of hearing in the *L’homme* is a good example of this procedure, and especially music, since the tones, as constituents of music, were reduced to quantitative objects. Musical perception is explained as a mechanistic transmission of those quantitative objects through movement and matter. According to Schütze, this theory is an anticipation of contemporary theories of neurobiological explanation of musical perception and musical imagination. As for the earlier text, the *Compendium musicae*, in it Descartes exposes a theory, according to which music is based on quantities: the quantities of the tones define perception of certain intervals, accords, harmonies and melodies: it is an arithmetic explanation of intervals which stands at the bottom of every musical explanation. Those musical proportions are sufficient to explain the influence of music upon man: in this early text Descartes hints at a physiological theory of perception of music. In this early text there is still no trace of *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, but in it one finds traces of the dualism which will be later developed by Descartes.
10. J. Rohls, “Johann Conrad Dippel und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit”. This article analyses one of the earliest critiques of Cartesian dualistic concept and the consequent mechanistic description of human body. This critique was launched by the pietist physician and theologian J. K. Dippel. His critique of Cartesian anthropology and his occasionalistic successors is directed towards the dualism of mind and body as well as against mechanism of entire nature including human body as it is represented in the determinism in the philosophy of Spinoza. Accordingly the text is divided into four sections. The first section gives an overview of Descartes’ model of human body as a machine which is no different than any other animal. The second section gives an overview of reception of Descartes’ theses among his successors, especially Henricus Regius (H. de Roy), J. Clauberg, and L. de La Forge. The third part is dedicated to Spinoza’s understanding of the relationship between the body and the mind. An important accent is put on the consequence of Spinoza’s anthropological metaphysics according to which there is no place for free will, if man is nothing but a connection of modes of the attributes of extension and thought and the mind not any more (like in Descartes) a thinking substance, but is in a way reduced to an idea which has the body as its object. Dippel enters into play in the fourth part. Dippel criticizes the dualism of the mind and the body which leads to the position that the mind cannot influence the body.
11. M. Schmeisser, “Die Erfindung des ‘mauvais sauvage’: Marquis de Sade’s *Butua* und das Bild des Kannibalen bei Léry und Montaigne”. The *Festschrift* closes with a philosophically unorthodox subject: it analyses Marquis de Sade’s fantastical Central African kingdom of Butua, which is characterized as a sort of anti-utopia. According to Schmeisser, Butua is Sade’s destruction of the myth of “noble savage”, which was widespread in the literature of the French Renaissance. The myth of the “noble savage”, as found in the texts of J. de Léry’s *Histoire d’un voyage fait en la terre de Brésil* and M. de Montaigne’s essay “Des Cannibales”, is an imaginary exemplification of the idea of the pure morality of the natural state. Sade turned this idea upside down and his main goal is to denounce the traditional ethics of virtue as petit-bourgeois hypocrisy. In consequence Sade develops a position of a sort of extreme “Thrasymachianism”: he tries to develop an ethics in which violence and strength are cardinal virtues, and according to which the brutal exploitation of the weak by the strong becomes a desired state. The opposition to “noble savage” is “potent man” (*homme puissant*). For Sade the “natural man” is not from Butua, but a brutal cannibal who follows the most egoistic laws of nature. According to Schmeisser, with this picture Sade tried to demythologize not only the proto-romantic fantasy about “noble savage” but to put in question every sort of ethics which takes some sort of goodness in human nature for granted.

It is hard, if not impossible, to give an overall assessment of such a thematically rich collection of numerous contribution, if for no other reason than subjective interests and idiosyncrasies of the author of this review. Without doubt it is an important addition to Renaissance studies in general – just with a few exceptions the whole book deals with this or that aspect of Renaissance philosophy in a widest sense – and everyone interested in Renaissance philosophy and civilization in general may find an article or two of his interest in it. But exactly here are the downsides of this book: despite its high price (according to www.amazon.de, accessed September 2010, the listed price is 198€) the book lacks most of helpful *apparati*: it has only a table of content and a laudatory Preface in honor of E. Keßler, written in quite a floral Latin, of few sentences in length. It has no *index rerum*, no *index nominum* which makes it virtually impossible to find anything in this 632 page long book. Further there is no list and short curricula of contributors which may show the width of the influence and inspiration E. Keßler might have on his friends, colleagues and students. And especially regrettably no initial or final text dedicated to the honoree of this *Festschrift*, prof. dr. Eckhard Keßler.

Luka Boršić

Gillian Brock

Global Justice

A Cosmopolitan Account

Oxford University Press, Oxford
2009

Gillian Brock believes that we can reconcile globalization and nationalism through a cosmopolitan concept of justice. This is the main idea presented in the book. The book is divided into three sections: “Theory”; “Moving from Theory to Public Policy: Closing the Gap between Theory and Practice”; “From Public Policy Back to Theory”. In these three sections, three central issues are presented: a concept of cosmopolitan justice, an idea of global justice and an idea of nationalism and equality in an account of global justice.

For Brock, cosmopolitanism is essentially connected with two central ideas: equal moral

worth of all individuals and obligations that are binding all of us, no matter where we are situated. Two main aspects of cosmopolitanism are identity and responsibility. This means that our identity and our responsibility are not restricted with the borders of the state or nation or culture. For that reason Brock believes that cosmopolitan concept of global justice is the best solution for the global poverty. Global poverty is one of the most pressing obstacles to realizing global justice because more than 25% of world’s population subsists below the international poverty line. There are three dominant theses why countries remain poor: geographic factors, integration into world market and quality of institutions and rule of law. Brock accepts all theses but argues that creating better institutions is a significant component in helping people to alleviate poverty. She advocates the so-called ‘quasi-institutional’ cosmopolitanism. The biggest problem is that people who live in rich and developed countries participate in maintenance global poverty because they benefit from it.

John Rawls’s *Law of People* has done a great influence on the work of G. Brock. Just as Rawls offers the second original position in his *Law of People*, Brock offers an idea of a global conference. She says that the global conference is an appropriate cosmopolitan original position. Delegates have been randomly selected and they have to decide what would be a fair interactions and relations among the world’s inhabitants. Of course, they do not know where they live, the size of the territory, how numerous or powerful the people are, what level of economic development is dominant in that territory, how well endowed it is with natural resources and so forth. However, they know everything about urgent global problems (various threats to peace and security, environment) that can be solved only through cooperation. At the global conference, delegates would reasonably agree about the minimum package of rights and goods. According to Brock, the minimum package would contain adequate position for everyone to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, possibility to meet basic needs and certain protections for basic liberties. Decent, but not equal, set of opportunities and a *needs-based minimum floor principle* would be chosen in the appropriate cosmopolitan original position. *Needs-based minimum floor* is a safety net for all individuals. System that in an appropriate way balances needs, entitlement and incentives would be permanent help for the worst off on the global level. Delegates would not choose fair equality of opportunity and the global difference principle because

these principles are not applicable on the global level. When we try to extend them from the state to the global arena, we face with the problem how different cultures value different ends or goods. The desirability of a position will often vary in accordance with these different valuations.

Brock wants to develop a cosmopolitan concept of global justice that allows us to address not only matters of global distributive justice but other global justice issues as well. Global problems require global cooperation for effective solution. We all are internationally interdependent (through economic and political association), and vital resources should be understood as a global commons to be regulated for the use and benefit of all. Brock argues, at the end of the first section, that *global governance* (not world government) is necessary. Global governance does not necessary include world state but it includes mixtures of delegating responsibilities for particular domains to various institutions, with multiple agencies able to hold each other accountable and other ways of reconfiguring the structure of governance bodies at the global level so they are brought into line better with cosmopolitan goals. Brock argues that model of *global governance* has already existed but it still does not function in a fair way. We can assess fair global arrangements in terms of two main desirable variables, which are sometimes in tension: effectiveness and accountability. For that reason, she is arguing for a *responsive democracy* on the global level.

In second section, “Moving from Theory to Public Policy: Closing the Gap between Theory and Practice”, Brock considers a number of substantial issues requiring public policy reforms like tackling global poverty, taxation reform, protecting basic liberties, humanitarian intervention, immigration and problems associated with the global economic order. Key issues of global justice are: meeting basic needs; protection of people’s basic liberties; ensuring fair terms of cooperation in global institutions and fair terms for social and political arrangements. Reform of international tax regime could be an important vehicle for realizing global justice. Brock offers some proposals that have enjoyed the most serious consideration so far: the carbon tax, air ticket tax, email taxes, tax on world trade, tax on international arms trade, aviation fuel taxes. Implementation of those proposals needs an institutional framework. One solution is introduction a global taxation. Large corporations and wealthy individuals are effectively escaping taxation so the tax burden is frequently shifted onto ordinary citizens and smaller businesses. Global tax system would provide

better distribution of goods and economic conditions for basic needs. After the basic needs are met, we can derive basic liberties, particularly the need for autonomy. We have already seen that delegates in the ideal choosing situation would choose certain protections for basic liberties. Global and local fair economic conditions are important issues for that goal. Reasonable people will care, at last minimally, about enjoying a certain level of liberties. Brock argues that liberties may not be the only thing they care about and often they may not care about them very much when other issues are at stake about which they care more deeply. They can care more about two basic needs: health and security. When these basic needs are provided, they would care for other three basic needs: understanding, autonomy (liberties) and decent social relations.

The author analyses issues of humanitarian intervention and immigration as global problems. Humanitarian intervention is usually military intervention so it usually involves a violation of sovereignty. Brock argues that a state is not a sovereign state, if it does not protect the safety of citizens and promote their welfare. Sovereign state has internal responsibility, but it has also externally responsibility. State authority is accountable for its act to the international community. According to Brock, humanitarian military intervention may be justified to ensure basic needs and basic liberties but only after all non-military options for peaceful resolution of conflicts have been explored. In the second section, Brock argues about immigration policies. She says that she could not find any evidence that suggest that immigrants use welfare services or contribute more to crime in significantly greater proportions than the general populations or that immigrants take job away from local workers. She says that immigrants post cultural costs but that they also usually take up jobs that are perceived as dangerous, dirty or low paid jobs. However, she is skeptical that increasing immigration quota could constitute progress with respect to better realizing global justice.

In the last chapter of the second section author argues about the global economic order and global justice. She is very critical about well-known proclamation that free trade offers the best hope for the poor people or countries. Free trade is based on strict reciprocity and competition. Poor individuals and poor countries are not able to survive on global market under those conditions. G. Brock thinks that the *special and differential treatments* (SDT) and embracing *diffuse reciprocity* would be better condition for integrate poor countries in the global market. We have responsibilities

to improve global economic arrangements because we all participate on the same global market. For that reason, even rich countries would accept these suggestions because they also prefer stable and stronger international trade market. Brock's goal of economic justice is that international community or the society of states should make it possible for each country to have reasonable opportunities to achieve the level of economic activity necessary to sustain the goals of global justice.

In the third section the author is coming back "From Public Policy to Theory". This section Brock dedicates to the problem of nation states and nationality in the global world. For many people identity and responsibility crucially depend on national or ethnic belonging. Liberal nationalists (as Yeal Tamir and David Miller) have not yet offered an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals. Many people according to Brock believe that *a concentric circles model is a model of responsibilities to others* in which responsibilities are generally stronger to those physically or affectively closer to us. Idea of national identity is connected with the idea of mutual affiliation and responsibilities, and it is usually assumed that we are not able to make that kind of affiliation or responsibilities on global level. We usually favor our compatriots because of the gratitude (nations help one meet deep needs or desires, or are understood as source of security, or a mean to achieve self-identification). We understand nation-state as a mutually advantageous cooperative scheme; we share history and morality of affiliation, sense of solidarity. The so-called *compatriot favoritism* means that we will favour the non-basic interest of compatriots over basic needs or *interests of more needy foreigners*. The nations have rights to determine what policies are best for them except when their decisions inappropriately constrain self-determination of others. We must, Brock argues, balance defensible national interests with others' legitimate interests. Global justice requires that we are adequately positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life. This includes being enabled to meet our basic needs, certain guarantees about basic liberties and fair terms of cooperation. We have some basic (even positive) duties to everyone irrespective of their citizenship status. She defends the project of global governance from a pro-nationalist standpoint and 'nationalism skeptics'. Virtues do not recognize the boundaries. If we have the virtue of justice or the virtue of respect for rights of others, it is difficult to believe that we would fully have them within the nation state but lose them entirely when the context is broadened. Brock concludes that national-

ism can indeed have a legitimate role to play in people's lives and that there is a room for nationalism so long as the obligations of global justice are met. Nations have internal and external responsibilities and when both are met, nations should be given all the autonomy they would like to have.

In the next chapter of the third section, the author analyzes relations between equality, cosmopolitanism and global justice. She says that all forms of cosmopolitanism have in common a commitment to equality but that equality can be understood in a different way. Democratic equality promotes our standing in relations of equality with one another in a democratic community. According to Gillian Brock and Elizabeth Anderson, democratic equality is achieved when all are entitled to access to a certain minimum level of adequate functioning at all times. On the other hand *responsive democracy* secures interests that promote relations of equality when an agency-based conception of democracy is notoriously unreliable in doing this. For Brock, *responsive democracy* is the best conception of democracy for the global level. This conception is able to sustain the international tax organization, the organization to monitor recruitment of health care workers, the organizations to promote responsible press freedom etc. Self-proclaimed egalitarians offer several proposals for just basic structure: a commitment to the difference principle (T. W. Pogge, C. Beitz, D. Moellendorf), a commitment to global equality of opportunity (D. Moellendorf), equalize the value of natural resources between nations, endorse a global income (P. Van Parijs), a commitment to equal positive freedom. According to Brock these proposals can be realized only under some form of *global governance*.

Brock finishes her book with the chapter "Scepticism about feasibility and conclusion". She has been developing a model of global justice that takes seriously the equal moral worth of persons but leaves scope for a defensible form of nationalism. Her concept of global justice advocates that all people are adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, such that they are enabled to meet their basic needs. Their basic liberties are protected and there are fair terms of cooperation in collective endeavors. She thinks that *global governance* can co-exist with nation states. Global poverty can be mitigated with international taxation and accounting regime, which would also enable developing countries better to help themselves. In conclusion, she states that skepticism about feasibility of global justice is warranted because there is lack what global justice is or what the

goals of global justice should be. Goals, transition, measurement and motivation are the problems that rise skepticism about the feasibility of global justice. A problem also rises with lack of knowledge on what works and what does not work in trying to help the worst off, or whether we have made some progress in mitigating the poverty. There is a lack of institutions or agents that have power or moral authority to act in order to enforce, secure or promote global justice and so on. The biggest problem is how we would sanction non-compliance in the case of those who do not play their required part, especially if the non-compliance is powerful state. However, Brock is an optimistic thinker. We have to recognize ourselves as the world citizens. In that recognition we can find the biggest influence in creating the necessary motivation for building a better world. Brock believes that we all have to work together on the project called 'global justice'.

Marita Brčić

Amir Muzur

Tajne mozga (Mysteries of the Brain)

Medicinska naklada Zagreb,
Biblioteka "Posebna izdanja"
("Special Editions" Series), Zagreb
2010

The title *Mysteries of the Brain* calls for reading *per se* and the reader expects that he/she will discover in it what is implied by the 'mystery' and what the mystery, which conceals answers to numerous meanings and interpretations of the brain, represents to the layman. Namely, the word 'brain' in itself is associated to mind and intelligence, skills and abilities, and at the same time also to a warning that brain is still unexplored and that even today there are many unknowns related to it. We approached reading this book with anticipation that the author, in this scope of questions, will present the brain and reveal its mysteries. At the beginning of this presentation we will emphasise that what is common to all the titles written in it. First thing that attracts the reader to the book, are titles listed in the contents. The second is the author's

foreword in which he draws our attention to the fact that his starting goal in writing this book was to make science closer to us and applicable in everyday life.

With the first chapter "Journey into the Micro Cosmos" Muzur introduces us to the methodological approach that he abides by all up to the final page of the book. It consists of the medical approach, the latest scientific discoveries and results of research, physico-chemical explanation of what happens in the brain in a specific situation, the historical approach, religio-theologian explanation, philosophical interpretation, connection to art, psychological determination, poetic perception, foundation in moral sayings, analysis of a case that speaks about a person who has confronted with certain difficulty for which the brain is responsible, media coverage, and cultural model within which a specific instance, in Muzur's words, mystery of the brain is defined and questioned. To all this we must add that presented texts are accompanied by graphical displays or illustrations which complete the comprehension of what is being read and makes reading even more interesting.

After these introductory notes we approach presentation of what is written in the book. The chapters "Eye to Eye", "Red and Black" and "Shortcomings and Advantages of the Dark" actualise the sense of sight, structure of the eye, movement of the eyes, the way in which light enters the eye, the occurrence of daltonism, activities that occur in the brain, brain cells, that is the "visual part of the brain". From the first of these chapters remains memorised that "during all tasks the brain carries out and during the processing of visual information almost the entire cerebral cortex is activated and, to our dismay, with speed and logic that we only partially manage to follow and understand" (p. 18). The second chapter "Red and Black" introduces us to the mysteries of distinguishing colours, the electromagnetic spectrum of radiation which the eye registers, and the brain controls. Thereby in this part we find out why we distinguish colours, about the sensitivity in the area of the blue, green and red part of the light spectrum and that the brain developed a mechanism which enables it an appearance of a consistency of colours which is manifested in "that irrespective of the lighting the brain records always the same proportions of individual parts of the spectrum which effects in, for example, how we see the same t-shirt as red in daylight and under neon lighting" (p. 23). In the chapter "Shortcomings and Advantages of the Dark" contained are the answers to questions why some persons are blind, why they have a greater sensitivity of recognition

by voice, melody, touch and smell. Here we meet with the Braille alphabet, the way in which it appeared, and with the appearance of blindsight. The point in question is about, up till now, insufficiently clarified occurrence characterised by the statement of a person not being able to see an object which is moving in front of his/her eyes, but will take hold of it by reaching in the right direction (p. 28). An especially interesting part, within this chapter, is recognising the differences between sleeping and dreaming of blind persons and those who are not.

The following two chapters “Air that Speaks” and “Music for the Brain” problematise sound. In the first the point in question is the travel of sound, the emergence of sound signals, reasons why our ear registers the quivering of sound of certain frequencies and the utilisation of ultrasound frequencies in navigation and in procedures of medical diagnostics. In the chapter “Music for the Brain” we find explanations why music influences our mood, what happens in the brain when we listen to music, sensitivity to sound of people with autism and causes of an innate inability to recognise tones or innate tone deafness.

Muzur analyses the sense of smell in two chapters: “Spiritual Fruits of Scent” and “With Taste of the Sea, with Taste of Salt”. In the first chapter, he teaches us that as opposed to other sensory pathways, the ones for smell do not intersect, that results of the latest researches (University of Quebec) point out that a pleasant scent may decrease the feeling of pain, the difference of this sensory organ in women and men, and illnesses that emerge due to the loss of the sense of smell. In the other chapter, the author explains the combination of two senses: smell and taste, brain “activities” that influence our ability to differentiate taste and a discovery from 1931 that pointed out that the intensity of this taste is hereditary, and why it is different from one person to another (p. 53).

“Touch and Other Bodily Senses” is part of the book in which Muzur teaches us what body senses are and what happens to them on the way to the brain. When is touch best sensed, what are superficial and what are deep senses, how they travel to the brain and why, for example, “the sense of touch on the thumb of the left hand ends up in the cerebral cortex of the right hemisphere” (p. 58). Of special interest in this part of the book is the explanation of what happens in the brain and with the brain in case of loss of some part of the body. Words that follow have a double task: first, they explain the appearance, and second, illustrate the claim that the book is written distinctly and intelligibly which contributes to

an interest for continuation of reading. Therefore, the author says: “Injury to some part of the body (e.g. loss of a finger) will ‘cast out’ that part of the body from the machine and information from it will no longer pour in to the cerebral cortex. This part of the cortex will in time ‘shrink’ like washed clothes, while the neighbouring areas will expand to its favour” (p. 60). Additionally, Muzur teaches us to differentiate senses and reflexes, and for reflex actions we find out that, due to the speed of action and protection from danger, the brain does not have time to react and the command for protection is issued by the spinal cord without consultation with the brain. Phantom pain, reasons for its appearance and duration, are components of this part of the book.

The following structural part carries the title “Pain”. The author draws special attention of the reader to the comprehension and relation of pain in different cultures, then to ways of alleviating pain, and reasons why even today local anaesthesia is applied during amputation.

“Synaesthesia” is a title behind which the author explains meaning of the term. Here we find out that synaesthesia is a cross-wiring of senses, that there are persons who connect senses in most peculiar combinations, that the subject of the matter are persons who have an above average memory, that it is still unknown why in the brain of some persons occurs connection of different and usually separate senses and that it can justly be claimed that the Russian composer Alexander Scriabin and Hungarian musician Franz Liszt lived with this condition.

Subsequently follows the part “Learning, Memorising, and Forgetting” which should be read and investigated by every student, as well as educational and science employees. Reading this part makes learning interesting, useful and undeferrable, released of pressure and fear and conditioning. All of this included because Muzur clearly points out to the relation between learning, memorising and forgetting and to the natural course and individual differences within all three processes. What is written in the book has its practical implementation in the recognition of styles of learning of pupils and students.

“By Hook or by Crook: the Autonomous Nerve System” is a chapter that points out that in our body some things happen contrary to our will. Importance to those phenomena is given by the fact that they save the human life and protect health. The matter of subject is the functioning of the heart, breathing, bowel peristalsis, gland secretion and similar, for which individual brain structures are re-

sponsible, and for this to be more clear, the author explains where centres of the autonomous nerve system responsible for the uninterrupted course of mentioned life functions are located.

Control of feeling is explained by the author in the chapter “When Heart Goes Dum Di Dum: Feelings”. Here it becomes more clear why we define a certain condition as fear, happiness, sadness, why some of these states are followed by shivering, flowing of tears, sweating, and why emotionally charged contents are memorised the best. The presented case, addressed in the book as ‘case S.M.’, clearly points out to the previous results of research related to the responsibility of the brain for emotional states in which we can find ourselves, and to a still great challenge in seeking answers to the issue of relationship between brain and physical reactions to an individual emotion. Instincts do not carry a negative meaning in themselves, nor are they something of which we have to be ashamed, that is, part of our reactions we have to hide. Certainly, all this under the condition we know what they are, from where they arise, why they appear, how the brain manages them and why they are interpreted differently in different cultures. Hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleepiness, sex drive, and instinct for maintaining body temperature, are instincts whose mechanism becomes clearer in reading this part of the book, and by virtue of the explanation mentioned there, they become more natural and close to us. After instincts, by natural course of events, appears the need for explaining the phenomenon of sleep. Why are we sleepy, how do we sleep, what does occur in each phase of sleep, why is the time of sleep individual, why are we sleepless and why do we suffer from insomnia, why do we snore, why do we need time to adapt in cases of time-zone change, and why does somnambulism occur – all these questions receive comprehensible answers, and every mentioned phenomenon become clear to us, recognisable and, what is equally important, make researches related to them necessary and justifiable.

Sigmund Freud and his pupil Carl Gustav Jung are presented in the chapter “Dreams”. The content-related and methodological approach to dreams are shown in an authoritative way, both scientists are brought closer to the readers, and the existence of differences in their explanations are dictated by the level of achieved in the field of medicine and psychology.

“Hypnosis” is the penultimate chapter in the book *Mysteries of the Brain*. Hypnosis, a mystery *per se*, becomes dispossessed of mystery by explanation of what happens to a person under hypnosis, and the implementation of hypnosis for the purpose of remedying mental illnesses, treatment of neuroses, causes and effects of psychosomatic hardships confronting persons who find themselves in the area of one of the mentioned problems.

And the last chapter of the book is “Drugs and the Brain”. By actualisation of the use of coffee, tobacco, nicotine all up to narcotic drugs the author problematically approaches consequences that consummation provokes, and clearly warns of their harmfulness, that is, makes responsible persons who have found themselves in the circle of drugs for consequences that others, who neither guilty nor bound by their own fault may suffer because of them, e.g. children.

All of the aforementioned indicates that the book *Mysteries of the Brain* has realised the goal for which it was developed. In comprehensible words it has explained the structure and function of the brain, responsibility of its individual parts for conditions and occurrences within the body, for consequences in behaviour, and has referred to the necessity for further researches of the brain. The way in which it was written, contents it has covered and methodology through which it has explained the content, deserves a recommendation for teaching material for students educating for medical, psychological and pedagogic professions, current practitioners within them, and the public to whom books like these bring closer science and scientific researches.

Nada Gosić