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Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth
Res Publica, 25 (2019), 1; 39-54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4

Archer, Alfred; Engelen, Bart; Ivanković, Viktor

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Archer, A., Engelen, B. i Ivanković, V. (2019). Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth. Res Publica, 25. (1), 39-54. doi: 10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4

Archer, Alfred, et al. "Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth." Res Publica, vol. 25, br. 1, 2019, str. 39-54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4

Archer, Alfred, Bart Engelen i Viktor Ivanković. "Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth." Res Publica 25, br. 1 (2019): 39-54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4

Archer, A., Engelen, B. i Ivanković, V. (2019) 'Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth', Res Publica, 25(1), str. 39-54. doi: 10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4

Archer A, Engelen B, Ivanković V. Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth. Res Publica [Internet]. 2019. [pristupljeno 17.06.2022.];25(1):39-54. doi: 10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4

A. Archer, B. Engelen i V. Ivanković, "Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth", Res Publica, vol. 25, br. 1, str. 39-54, 2019. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:524860. [Citirano: 17.06.2022.]

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