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Croatian Philosophers II: Juraj Dragišić – Georgius Benignus de Salviatis (ca. 1445–1520)

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ABSTRACT: The article presents the life and work of Juraj Dragišić, a philosophical and theological writer, as one of the most important and influential Croatian philosophers of 15th and 16th century. A brief presentation of his university and ecclesiastical career is followed by a closer examination of some of Dragišić's works in which he discusses a whole range of philosophical, theological, and logical issues, such as the problem of the authenticity of prophecies, freedom of will, restoration of Christianity, logics, and dialectical skill, and others. In the conclusion, it has been pointed out that Dragišić was, not only due to his works, but also his ecclesiastical and political career, a true man of his time that in the intellectual sense anticipates certain tendencies which are to become prominent in the mid of the 16th century.

KEY WORDS: Juraj Dragišić, Humanism, Renaissance philosophy, freedom of will, authenticity of prophecies, Aristotelian logic, restoration of Christianity.

1. Biography

Juraj Dragišić, a philosopher and theologian, Franciscan from Srebrenica, Bosnia (as he explicitly pointed out), is also known as Georgius Benignus, Georgius Benignus de Salviatis, Georgius de Argentina, Georgius Benignus de Felicis, Georgius Grecus de Bosnia, and Georgius Macedonus – Latin names by which he signed his works. Even the scholars who write about him mention different versions of his Croatian name, therefore he has been cited Dobrotić, Dobretić or Dragišić. Since some documents from his time mention his last name as Dragišić (for example, in 1490, in a letter by Pope Innocent VIII he was mentioned as Dragišić; in 1491, in a letter by the Florentine Republic sent to Sultan Bayezid he was named Draghisic), we have decided to adopt this version of his last name. Dragišić is one of those Croatian philosophers, who like so many other Renaissance Humanist philosophers and theologians pursued an important ecclesiastical, scientific, and university career on foreign soil (mostly in Italy) and gained reputation of a renowned thinker across Europe. He built up contacts with many important figures of the Renaissance Humanist epoch and took part in certain events which had

a profound impact on the spiritual history of Europe, especially the periods of Humanism and Renaissance. Closer examination of Dragišić's role in these events is of double significance. First of all, it enables us to understand certain stages of his intellectual development, his university and scientific career, and it furthermore provides an insight into some of the crucial moments in these events. Here it should be emphasized that one can learn most about his life and his involvement in these events from him and his works.

Dragišić received rudimentary education in Bosnia. Early on he left home fleeing from Turkish invasion. After his short stay in Zadar, he headed for Italy where he continued the study of theology at some of the oldest Italian universities, first in Ferrara, and later on in Pavia, Padua, and Bologna. He was ordained as a priest in the cathedral in Bologna, in 1469. After that he and other Conventuals went to Rome, where he encountered many Greek theologians and philosophers, who like him fled from Turkish invasion. This contact with intellectuals belonging to the circle gathered around cardinal Bessarion, was to play an important, if not, crucial role in Dragišić's intellectual development. Especially his close friendship with cardinal Bessarion, who named him Benignus. It seems that Dragišić's appointment as a tutor at Montefeltro castle in Urbino in 1472 was due mostly to Bessarion's references. At the urging of Bessarion, Dragišić got involved in the dispute between Bessarion and Georgius Trapezuntius, who, in reply to Bessarion's treatise *In calumniatorem Platonis* (in which he defends Plato), published in 1469, wrote a treatise in which he accused Bessarion of having presented thirteen heretical theses. Dragišić, who was then only twenty-three years old, stood up in Bessarion's defense with his treatise most probably titled *Defensorium Cardinalis Bessarionis*. However, the treatise was lost (in his work *De natura coelestium spirituum quos angelos vocamus* or shorter *De natura angelica* Dragišić claimed that the treatise had been lost during his stay in England). Dragišić's treatise *De libertate et immutabilitate dei* (which remained in manuscript) was also dedicated to cardinal Bessarion.

After his stay in Rome, Dragišić went to Urbino, where he became a tutor to Guidobaldo, one of Frederico Montefeltro's sons, to whom he dedicated his treatise *Fridericus, De animae regni principe*. He dedicated one of his works *De communicatione divinae naturae* to Frederico Montefeltro. In Urbino, Dragišić was accepted into the Felici family. After Frederico's death in 1482, he left Urbino. Dragišić travelled to Oxford and Paris, the most important university centers of that time. In 1482, on his way to Holy Land, he stayed in Dubrovnik, where the municipal documents recorded the stay of Jure Bošnjak, called Dragišić. In 1485, Dragišić became a member, and soon after that, the prior of the monastery of the Holy Cross in Florence. There, he was accepted into the noble family Salviati, so his full name was Georgius Benignus de Salviatis.

In Florence he joined the intellectual circles of Lorenzo de Medici, to which some of the most important Renaissance philosophers, such as Fici-

no, Pico della Mirandola, Poliziano, Cristoforo Landino, and others belonged, and he became tutor to Lorenzo's sons (Giovanni was later to become Pope Leon X). Lorenzo encouraged him to take part in a theological debate with a Hungarian Dominican Nicholas de Mirabilibus. The content of the debate was published in the treatise *Mirabilia septem et septuaginta*, dedicated to Lorenzo de Medici. At Lorenzo's request, he took over the defense of Pico della Mirandola, whose 900 theses had been fiercely criticized because of some heretical stands. The fact that Lorenzo had chosen him to participate in the debate as a defender of Pico's theses reveals the reputation which Dragišić, this "preacher of the learned" as he was known in Florence (Dragišić himself pointed out that he was "Florentini populi doctor"), enjoyed not only with the powerful de Medici, but also in the intellectual circles in Italy. This was his second defense and at the same time an important event in the spiritual history of Italy, which left an indelible mark on his further intellectual development as well as his life path. A successful theological and academic career of Juraj Dragišić, who, in 1490, became the provincial of the Franciscan province of Tuscany, and who was at the same time a professor of theology and philosophy, was brought to a stop by a rebellion against the Medici family. After his imprisonment and banishment from Tuscany, he went to Dubrovnik where he actively participated in the cultural and political life of the city. There, in 1496, he was appointed as vicar of the Dubrovnik archbishopry, however he never assumed this post. During his stay in Dubrovnik, he worked on one of his most important theological treatise *De natura angelica (On Angelic Nature)*, later published in Florence, in 1499. In Dubrovnik he also wrote his most famous work *Propheticae Solutiones (Prophetic Solutions)*, published in 1497. With this treatise he stood up in defense of a Florentine prophet Girolamo Savonarola. This was the third defense in his life, which, just as the previous two, had some far-reaching consequences for his future life.

When the situation in Italy calmed down, Dragišić left Dubrovnik for Italy where he was rehabilitated and successfully took up his scientific and ecclesiastic career. So, in 1503, he became headmaster of the Franciscan institution of higher education in Rome. Pope Julius III named him bishop of Cagli, and in 1512, he was nominated archbishop of Nazareth. He also works as professor of theology at Sapienza in Rome.

Finally, in 1517, Dragišić joined the dispute around Johann Reuchlin. He was appointed as a member of a 22-member committee formed by Pope with the purpose of giving a verdict in the suit against Reuchlin, that is against his treatise *Augenspiegel*, which defended Jewish books. Dragišić's positive opinion on Reuchlin's views was decisive for the committee's liberating stand. Dragišić expounded his view in a 1517 treatise *Defensio optimi ac integerrimi viri illius Joannis Reuchlin*. The second edition of the book appeared in 1518, which testifies to its popularity. This was also his fourth defense. Dragišić or Georgius Benignus de Salviatis took part in Lateran

Council in the period between 1512 and 1517. With this treatise Reuchlin stood up in defense of Jewish books primarily due to his scientific motives as a humanist. Reuchlin stood against the incineration of Jewish books proving that they can help better understanding of some basic precepts of Christian religion, by giving insight into its sources. Dragišić died in Barleta or in Rome in 1520.

Even though he was very engaged in social life as well as being active as church dignitary and a professor of theology and philosophy, Dragišić left some 20 published works and another 10 in manuscript.

2. On the Authenticity of Savonarolian Prophecies

Dragišić's most famous work is *Propheticae Solutiones (Prophetic Solutions)*, published in 1497, in Florence. This book had been written during his stay in Dubrovnik, and as he himself said after being encouraged by the representatives of the Dubrovnik Republic. First and foremost, this work testifies to one specific moment of Italian and European spiritual history, to a turning point of the European West in which the whole spiritual tradition was endangered by outer (Turkish) threat as well as by an internal crisis. By this we mean a profound moral and intellectual crisis that was shattering the very foundations of European civilization until the end of the Middle Ages. And it is in this turning point that the "new prophet" Girolamo Savonarola appeared, and whom Dragišić perceived to be a messenger sent by God, who would teach mankind on the possibility and the way of carrying out restoration (*renovatio*) which presented itself as a necessity.

Since it was written during Dragišić's stay in Dubrovnik, this work represents a significant document for the cultural history of the town. Namely, it bears witness to ties between the leading Dubrovnik intellectuals of that time and the town of Florence, and especially to the impact of Savonarola's prophecies in this area. Thus Dragišić writes that "in Dubrovnik, ie. Ragusa or Epidaur there are talks about God's man on a daily basis. And that highly educated and distinguished townspeople are ardent defenders of Savonarola's life and teachings. And while in Florence there are those who question him, only his pupils and admireres can be found in Dubrovnik." Dragišić openly admits that he undertook Savonarola's defence because the citizens of the Dubrovnik Republic urged him to.

Starting with the question whether the authentic prophets are possible after John, and whether Savonarola really is (that kind of) a prophet, this work represents an attempt to prove the credibility of Savonarola's prophecies and the authenticity of Savonarola as a prophet. Here we should bear in mind the fact that Savonarola began espousing his prophecies in the 90's of 15th century. They were aimed at the Medici (whose protege was Dragišić), first of all, at Lorenzo the Magnificent, but also at the immoral life of the Roman court, at the same time announcing the coming of the restorer of the

church, Carl VIII. Dragišić, as the “preacher of the learned”, explicitly testifies that he used to listen to Savonarola’s sermons and that he knew him. In order to prove the authenticity of Savonarola as a prophet, in the first part of his treatise Dragišić discusses the possibility of certain knowledge of the future, determines the possibility of new prophets and usefulness of the knowledge of the future and the prophetic. After putting forward theoretical assumptions about the possibility of new prophecies, discussing the prophetic phenomenon in general and the criteria for determining and differentiating the true, authentic and unauthentic prophecies, in the second part Dragišić moves on to examine a particular case, this being Savonarola’s. Here he proves the authenticity and credibility of Savonarola’s prophecies by presenting the content of these prophecies, which he holds to be providence in this turning point of history, sent to mankind as a message about the possibility of restoration. Supporting a thesis about Savonarola’s authenticity as a prophet, he names some important characteristics of Savonarola’s life, of this “prophet of the desperate”, as Savonarola was called in Florence.

The treatise *Prophetic Solutions* contains three fundamental layers of expounding the above mentioned issues. The first layer is mainly of theological significance, the second represents theologico-philosophical debate over the possibility of knowledge of the future in general, and in the third, based on the theoretical aspects of eschatological-prophetic phenomenon, he elaborates Savonarola’s prophecies in an attempt to prove their credibility.

The debate over the possibility of new prophecies, ie. prophecies after John, starts with Dragišić’s collocutor in the dialogue (*Prophetic Solutions* was written in the form of dialogue) Ubertinus Risaltius reminding us of Biblical words “The Law and Prophets since John”. Dragišić then expounds his view according to which, regardless of the fact that prophecies in their real sense are only those that announced the Saviour and the fact that the old prophecies are greater than the new ones, the new prophecies are possible after all. According to him, there is not any great difference between the prophecies of the old and new age because “what the old prophets foretold and what we preach today is the same”. This can then be applied to the “new prophet”, to “our prophet” (*vates noster*) as Dragišić calls him, ie. to Savonarola, who preaches restoration which will bring a millennial unity of the Christian Church. “Our new prophet”, according to Dragišić, announces something similar to that which the old prophesied, ie. the salvation of all Christian peoples and their unification in faith. What follows is the question whether there is any point in the appearance of new prophets. Dragišić replies that they are necessary “because they confirm the old to the unfaithful with the new prophecies.” Moreover, the old prophecies were unclear and hence divine providence sends Florentines this prophet who will mediate the content of those prophecies in a clearer manner. “In other words, he can say the same so that it becomes clearer and more appealing by reiteration.”

In the third chapter, subsuming the phenomenon of prophesying under the phenomenon of divination, Dragišić elaborates the problem of divi-

nation (*divinatio*) in general. The debate includes issues such as the one whether any kind of divination is permissible for Christians at all. In the context of the debate over divination in general, Dragišić above all discusses the so called judicial astronomy (*astronomia judicialis*), ie. astrology. Adducing a thesis about the omnipotence of God's will, Dragišić comes to a conclusion that an absolutely impermissible or impossible form of announcing the future does not exist, which then also refers to the mentioned form of astrology. It only depends on God's will in which ways it will be announced to people, which form of revelation will be chosen. Thus "Quis enim potest prohibere revelationes eiusmodi" (sc. "prophetia per corpora coelestia")? Si Deus, omnium rex et sui gratia pater hominum, ea revelare voluerit" (NB. text is taken from the copy of a 1497 unpaginated Latin Florentine edition of the work *Propheticæ Solutiones*).

What is important in connection to the foretelling of the future is the criterion for differentiating between the true and false prophecies. Dragišić, in order to answer this question, first differentiates between the foretelling of the future according to the source and according to the degree of certainty. According to the source of knowledge, he distinguishes prophecies directly from God and those mediated by man. The most interesting part of the debate over the prophesying of the future is the one in which the degrees of certainty of knowledge are discussed, where Dragišić draws his conclusions by comparing the divine and human knowledge of the future.

Basic distinction is brought by a common place of scholastic debates over certain knowledge of God and only uncertain knowledge of man with the help of *lumen naturale*, ie. certain knowledge if it comes by divine light (*lumen supranaturale*). "Because neither the motion of the skies, nor the rising and setting of the stars are not, as it is clear from theology, known for sure to no one except to the only God, let alone the things that happen down here with us, mortal humans. In this case, the certain knowledge is accessible only to the one who is enlightened by God" ("Futura igitur scire notitia certa et ab omni suspitione remota nisi a Deo illustratus potest nemo".) All the while God possesses the evident knowledge of the future and it is his proper (*proprium Deo*), the knowledge of the future is uncertain to any created mind ("Futura omni creatae menti incerta esset soli Deo evidenta"). According to some, thus God cannot mediate this evident knowledge to a created mind because this would mean equating that kind of mind with the divine. In opposition to such views, Dragišić holds that nothing prevents God from giving a man specific and certain knowledge of the future and concludes that this does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the man is God nor that he should be considered God. The one who announces the future by participation in divine knowledge can only be God by participation (*participatione*). Although even the man may know the future and specific and necessary, according to Dragišić, it is possible only by God's grace.

According to the degree of certainty we distinguish the determined and necessary prophecy from the undetermined and unnecessary. Men can, through secondary causes, know the future only undeterminedly and unnecessarily. Even if it would be possible to read future events from the stars, it would always be undetermined and unnecessary since the first cause could prevent it (“eo quod prima causa posset impedire”). However, Dragišić does not deny the man a possibility to know the future even “determinate et necessario” (determinedly and necessarily), but he points out that this is possible only for the one who is enlightened by God (“a Deo illustratus”).

Then he works out in detail the criteria for discerning the true, God inspired prophet, and concludes how a genuine prophet is endowed with the capacity to understand that which has been seen “in visione”. Completely in accordance with this humanistic outlook, Dragišić concludes that the true, genuine prophecy, except for the vision sent by God, requires *reason*, which is manifested in Savonarola’s case (this serves as one of the proofs for the authenticity of his prophecies). Thus, only the one who participates in divine light, the light of the truth, can certainly know the future. In any case the one who prophesies enlightened by God, at the same time possesses consciousness about this. So, the true prophet sees and comprehends. Only those who are enlightened with the same light as the prophet can then recognize him.

After having established the determined and necessary knowledge of the future for God and the possibility of this knowledge by participation, with God’s grace, for man, one important question remains to be solved – question of relations of foreknowledge (*praescientia*) of the future and free human will. Dragišić deals with this philosophically most interesting problem in chapter 10 of *Prophetic Solutions*. This part of the treatise leads to the following: for some any possibility of certain knowledge of the future, especially future that springs from human will, removes the possibility of free will, the existence of which is certain through experience. God has left the man in the hands of his idea. “And if free will is denied, the entire moral philosophy is also denied, and all advice and encouragement will fail.” The question is then whether free will is possible if God knows in advance in the determined and necessary way and also knows what the man will want or do. At the end of this part of the debate, Dragišić points out that he “also professes freedom of our will and claims that God himself surely knows what it will want.” “Libertatem quippe voluntatis nostrae confitemur et ipsum Deum quaecunque volitura est, pro certo cognoscere asserimus”). Dragišić thus proves “et scientia Dei de futuris certa et nostrae voluntatis libertas manifesta”. The solution of this important question is brought by Dragišić through reconciliation between “via Scoti” and “via Thomae”, first of all, the argument of God’s eternity, ie. God’s reason that observes each thing at the same time (*simul*) and simultaneously in its total duration. With his unique insight he observes the total duration of things, at the same time observing his will – the first cause of everything and also everybody’s will. On

the top of that, Dragišić introduces the category of conditional knowledge, ascribing to God this very knowledge of the future (“*Scientia Dei de futuris esse conditionatam*”).

The elaboration of the above mentioned questions serves to Dragišić as a presumption for the justification of the thesis about the authenticity of Savonarola’s prophecies. This analysis of Dragišić’s best known work shows that he, in the debate about the then very current questions in theological circles, which gained on their significance, first of all due to political circumstances, but also the appearance of Savonarola’s prophecies, with his way of argumentation and adopted views, does not leave the framework of scholastic debate.

However, some new accents, typical for Humanism, can be noticed in this treatise. Regardless of the fact that he does so in the context of debate over prophetic phenomenon, Dragišić here discusses *knowledge*. The assumption and frame of this debate is the relationship between God and man, the question of the distinction between God’s and human knowledge, where by it is impossible not to notice Dragišić’s insistence on the usefulness of every knowledge, even the knowledge of the future for men. His thesis is as follows: “By knowledge the man perfects and every knowledge is useful to the man.” With this view of human knowledge and above all by stressing the possibility of participation in the highest forms of God’s knowledge (even though it happens only through God’s grace) Dragišić undoubtedly announces a new approach to *useful* knowledge, later on propagated by Renaissance philosophy.

The fundamental question that arises from Dragišić’s treatise is *the question of motives* which influenced this “prophet of the learned” when taking over Savonarola’s defense. It seems that even this particular “Savonarola case” and the general context of the debate, this being the prophetic phenomenon, the phenomenon of divination in general, served to affirm the central idea and intention that is the prime mover of all Dragišić’s stands and all his intellectual work, and this is the very idea of the restoration of (above all united) Christianity, which is his permanent preoccupation and which is, in various aspects and modifications, supported by philosophical-theological argumentation, his recurring theme in almost all of his works. In Dragišić’s (brave) stand in favour of Savonarola, at the same time we can easily notice consciousness of an intellectual of his time of a deep crisis of Christianity and above all ecclesiastic tradition and awareness of their time as the time of “turning points”, of the coming of the “new”. Dragišić’s own words from the treatise point to his motives for defending Savonarola’s prophecies. Thus, at the very beginning he points out “that it is known that times are coming in which Christ’s church from far and away around the world should come under one pen”, and the prophet Savonarola was sent to “confirm John’s prophecy from the 18th chapter of Revelation and to announce restoration.”

In the end, we may conclude that, regardless of all speculation and guessing about the source of Dragišić's interest for eschatological-prophectic complex (which some connect with a possible influence of neoplatonic Florentine circle in which the problem of divination, thanks to the revival of some ancient philosophical-theological tradition became current issue), it seems that his interest above all arises from his personal, specific situation in which an exile in the Christian world, eroded and threatened both from the inside and outside, and that he is oriented to completely specific prophecies (namely Savonarola's), presented in an utterly specific historical and political situation (primarily Italy's and then Europe's), that were in fact more of a criticism of the current state than prophesying that which was bound to come.

3. The Question of Free Will

How important the question of will, in particular man's free will, is to Juraj Dragišić can be seen in his work *Fridericus, de animae regni principe*. This treatise, dedicated to Guidobaldo, Frederico Montefeltro's son, is divided into 5 chapters and starts with the question of the guiding principle of the soul ("quisnam sit in toto animae regno princeps") and wonders whether it is reason or will. First, something is said about powers (*potentiae*) of the soul, followed by the debate over the interrelation of the most significant powers, ie. the will (*voluntas*) and reason (*intellectus*). Then, he proceeds with the teaching about human acts with special focus on freedom and morality, and finally the end is dedicated to debate over the man's ultimate aim, to the greatest happiness and bliss.

First, Dragišić elaborates the function of reason (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*), the two most important powers of the soul, at the same time stressing, how regardless of all the differences, the word is, after all, about one spiritual substance. Debate is presented as a dialogue between Octavian and Frederico, who in fact represent two representatives of two most important strands of scholastic philosophy, expounding theses which are along the line with the teaching of Thomas Aquinas that is Duns Scot. The debate shows clearly the difference in views of the greatest powers of the soul. While the representative of Tomist strand stresses the primacy of reason (*intellectus*), the representative of Scotistic strand, which is closer to Dragišić (whose attitudes in the dialogue are spoken through Frederico), favours the primacy of will (*voluntas*). Octavian, the representative of Tomistic school, uses further arguments to prove "nobilitas intellectus": "ex parte habituum" (according to habits, behaviour), "ex parte operationum" (according to actions), "ex parte obiecti" (according to things). This is followed by Frederico's rebuttal and his attempt to prove "nobilitas voluntatis" using the argument of motion. If something contains the principle of motion ("habens ex sese principium motionis"), it is more elevated. This is what will is

like, which “moves reason and other abilities (powers) and is not itself moved by any other power (“sed voluntas movet quidem intellectum et ceteras vires, at ipsa a nulla vi alia moveri dicitur”, quoted according to the critical edition by Z. Šojat, page 158, see bibliography). The greatness of will is then proved with the reason of governance (“ratione imperii”). “Imperare est actus voluntatis” – Fridericus points out, that is Dragišić.

That Dragišić, inspite of his generally conciliatory attitude, bound to compromises, however definitely inclines to scholastic voluntarism is clearly expressed in the chapter in which “nobilitas voluntatis” is proved by reason of freedom (“ratione libertatis”). Here it is proved that freedom is necessarily bound to will and not to reason (“quod si qua in nobis libertas est, ea sit in voluntate”). Will is moved to act by nothing else but the act itself (“voluntatem enim nulla potentia movet ad actum”), and it is not defined. It chooses the object of discernment (“intellectio”) and is determined freely in regard to the object, be it with the love or hate relation. Since it defines itself and also the reason, for an act, will is not only the finest power of the soul, but it is also that which is the first in the man and which defines him, and this very potency of the soul makes the man different from animals. However, taking into account the usual and generally accepted Aristotelian definition of the man and his differentia specifica, Fridericus will later defuse his claim by pointing out that man is differentiated from animals *more* by *will* than reason (“homo magis distet a beluis voluntate quam intellectu et voluntas ea ratione sit praestantior”). The man is generally mostly will (“voluntas maxime homo”), and he is the only one who acts freely in the lower world. Because of this definition of the man, by which humanum is constituted in will, that being free will as the moving principle, which acts contrary to natural instinct, it seems possible to define Dragišić, who with his whole outlook belongs mostly to scholastic mental framework, also as Renaissance philosopher, who, with some of his attitudes, stands at the treshhold of modern outlook. Will, as principle that moves to an act in man, is only a reflection of will as a principle which “et homini et toti praeesse orbi”. After all, God controls everything “qua vero potentia nisi voluntate”? In this way, even God’s knowledge (*scientia Dei*) is not the first cause of things (“prima causa rerum”), but rather “God’s will”. “Thus the will is the first cause of all things and motions – of animal and human powers in a man; and it should be noted that will controls both the world and a man”. By closely defining will as power of the soul that is only by itself (from itself) free, Fridericus points out that will is different from natural instinct. Will is, precisely as “agens liberum”, opposed to free inclination (*appetitus*).

At the end of the treatise he finally discusses the primacy of reason, that is will, with regard to human aim, bearing in mind what is best for a man, what represents the biggest happiness and bliss. Here in particular the question of achieving highest happiness and bliss is intensified regarding Dragišić’s principled acceptance of Aristotle’s teaching (and according to Aris-

tote, as Octavian further on points out, highest bliss is in mind's observation, in the dialogue it's "visio") and simultaneous support for the thesis of the primacy of will.

According to Dragišić, the contemplation in which the Philosopher put "summum bonum" is the function of the will which defines us even for this kind of action. He also stresses that the best is confirmed as best only in relation to will. Contemplation is closely linked to love because we observe and think only what we like. What is best for us is like that because of the will. If there were no will in us, nothing would be good or best for us, Dragišić points out. Everything we have some kind of relation to, "we do for the love of our will". Even "contemplari" is nothing but "firmum tenere summum bonum ut continue amari possit". And this "to love the greatest good" is connected primarily with will. Because of all the mentioned reasons it follows that "total presence of contemplation arises from and depends on will". The true bliss (and that is man's ultimate aim, *ultimus finis*) is in actions of will and without will no one can be blessed, Dragišić points out, following Scot and states precisely: "bliss (beatitudo) is in love (amar)". In chapter 20, Dragišić discusses one important question of his time – action and contemplative life ("vita activa-vita contemplativa"). In this debate, Dragišić refers to authorities from Augustin and Tomas to Scot. In accordance with his attempt to achieve compromise, Dragišić will stress the interdependence of reason and will. However, he does not give up his overall thesis that the dominant potency in the world and in man is – will. This refers first of all to man's relation toward God in which will plays a dominant role both in the very moment of faith and in general acceptance and practice of fundamental Christian virtues. "Actus voluntatis erga Deum nobilior erit quam actus intellectus". In the end he concludes: "It is clear from it all that the governing principle of soul is will." ("Quibus iam patere potest regni animae principem esse ipsem voluntatem" on page 218 of the mentioned edition).

Even though Dragišić follows mostly scholastic debates over the primacy of reason, that is will, in this debate over the governing principle of the soul, he and some of his attitudes and new accents, especially those concerning determining man by free will, as well as his activist concept of man, he announces a modern approach to the man.

4. A Defense of Reuchlin

Another important work by Dragišić is an already mentioned treatise *Defensio praestantissimi viri Ioannis Reuchlin... per modum dialogi edita*, first published in 1517, and then in 1518. It is a testimony of Dragišić's participation in yet another important event in European spiritual history. In it he expounds his attitude in relation to some accusations against Johannes Reuchlin, that is against his attitude toward Jewish books. However, in order to un-

derstand the nature of the whole dispute, it is necessary to outline some of the most important basic information about this process.

At the beginning of 16th century, a German emperor sought an expert opinion from some of the most influential institutions and people, among others Reuchlin's, on a 1509 decree by which Jews had to hand over their books to the authorities. Reuchlin, a famous German humanist, educated in some of the most important Italian university centers where he came into contact with humanists like Ficino, Pico della Mirandola and others, pleaded for Jewish books not to be destroyed. His treatise on this issue was published under the title *Gutachten über das Jüdische Schriftum*, in 1511 published as *Augenspiegel*. Thanks to the influence of Italian (neo)platonist circle gathered around Pico and Ficino, which promoted specific concepts of restoration of Christianity by returning to the origins of religious teaching, and to this end, there was a revival of ancient philosophical-theological traditions, among which was also cabalistic one. Reuchlin, following his humanistic outlook, stood in defense of Jewish books. His basic argument in favor of the books (Talmud above all) is that they provide better understanding of Christian origins and can serve for the conversion of Jews to Christianity. Reuchlin's motives were scientific, which is proved by his earlier works in which he had followed the steps of that strand of humanistic thought whose most important representatives were Nicolaus Cusanus and Raymundus Lullus (Reuchlin took part in the publishing of Cusanus's works in Paris in 1514, while the latter relied on Raymund Lullus in outlining his work *De pace fidei*, whose long lasting preoccupation was *concordia* of all the nations). Both philosophers supported the unification of all traditions of revelation which culminated in Christian revelation, and from that position they defended Jewish (especially cabalistic) spiritual tradition. Reuchlin as well as the other two cared to show the existence of one truth in all religious traditions. Reuchlin's works presented the apparent relying on that tradition, which can be clearly seen in his *De Verbo mirifico* and *De arte cabalistica*. His attitudes towards Jewish books were condemned. A commission with the purpose of examining the whole case, whose member was Dragišić, was established in Rome. However, he gave a positive opinion on Reuchlin's attitudes and by doing so he influenced other members of the commission. Dragišić's attitudes to this case were brought in the treatise *Defensio Praestantissimi viri Ioannis Reuchlin...*

At the very beginning, dedicated to the emperor Maximilian, Dragišić, as the prime motive of his defense of Reuchlin's stand, brings what is a major issue when it comes to the understanding of his engagement in this affair. This is "per linguarum diversitatem gentes ad unitatem fidei catholicae ducere" (markation of the page Biiij of the aforementioned treatise). So, the aim is to come to *unity through diversity*. In the dialogue, in which Dragišić defends official stand of the Church in connection to Jewish books, and Reuchlin his own views that defend books from destruction, the starting

question is whether these books should or should not be destroyed (“An Iudaeorum libri, quos Talmud appellant, sint potius supprimendi, quam tenendi et conservandi”). Reuchlin supports the preservation of the books because they contain absolutely nothing blasphemous “for our religion” and cannot be considered heretical in the real sense. He above all supports that they should first be studied properly in order to grasp the truth “of our religion” more easily. Besides, Reuchlin, an excellent connoisseur of Greek and Hebrew languages, supports philological analysis of the Bible, which will be enabled by knowledge of Greek and Hebrew languages and books. The dialogue clearly shows Reuchlin’s conviction how Jewish books can help us understand the Christian truth. Later on in the text, he will give his opinion, that the Jews will be brought closer to Christianity if those books are studied and if their “true teaching” is brought to light as presented by their doctors. His further argument in favor of preservation of the books is the possibility that, based on comparison of different sources, we can discern false from true teachings. Fundamentally, Talmud books bring the true because they “tell the secrets of our religion” (“libri Talmud vera docent quia fidei nostrae mysteria pandunt”), even though they also contain some wrong and crazy things. However, they cannot be proclaimed heretical. Basic argument, however, favoring the thesis that “libros Hebraeorum nobis utiles esse” is that we interpret the Bible with their help (“Et quia illi libri sensum Scripturae sacrae interpretantur”). The view that makes it clear that the basic motive for Reuchlin’s defense of Jewish books originates from his humanistic outlook we may find in his words according to which these books must not be destroyed only because they say something that is different from our views and beliefs! “Commentaria Iudaeorum tanquam *fontes* esse servanda” – Reuchlin repeatedly points. “Texts of the Hebrew truth are like the source for other texts. (“Textus Hebraicae veritatis est sicuti fons ad alios textus”). They are to our texts that are the source of the faith as mother is to son.

In the end, if we try to answer the question of Dragišić’s motives for his engagement in Reuchlin’s case, first we should bear in mind the fact that both Reuchlin and Dragišić had been intellectually formed under the influence of the same neoplatonic circle in Florence, where the striving to unite different spiritual traditions, from Orphic and Pitagorean, Chaldeic-Hermetic, Hebrew and Cabalistic to Christian (with stressing the compatibility of basic Christian precepts with those traditions), was basic direction. Siding with intellectual inclination of that circle, which could condition Dragišić’s sympathies for Reuchlin’s attitudes in connection to Jewish books, comes from one insight that serves as a foundation of all of his works of philosophical and theological significance, insight, namely, into the necessity of Christian *restoration*. According to the members of these circles, this restoration should be carried out by going back to the sources, to genuine forms of Christian faith, and also with the help of Dragišić’s work, and then of the whole Reuchlin dispute and Jewish books, is the fact that it is primarily the

matter of the problem of the interpretation of texts, the problem of *understanding* the Bible, and this has its roots indisputably in the conscious need for the *restoration* of Christianity. Anyway, the very insistence on the new possibilities of interpretation comes from the circles which explicitly stressed *renovation* (*renovatio*) as basis of their programme. As we had seen, Reuchlin and Dragišić, belonged to these circles. The first one directly, the second one indirectly, standing up in defense of the first, represent a tie between two strands of realization of the programme of renovation: “the Southern” variants that will be manifested in the framework of Italian (and then also Croatian) Humanism, and later Renaissance and those “northern”, which will be manifested especially in Germany as reformation movement.

5. On the Nature of Angels

One of the best known published works of theological significance by Juraj Dragišić is *De naturae coelestium spiritum quos angelos vocamus* or shorter *De natura angelica*. Dragišić dedicated this work to the senate of Dubrovnik (“ad illustrem atque religiosum Epidaurinum seu Rhacusinum Senatam”). Work is significant primarily in the biographical sense because in the introduction we find out directly from Dragišić’s pen many details of his life. Here he points how he had to leave Srebrenica because of the Turkish invasion and went to Italy where he continued his studies, and later on travelled to Paris and England. He thanks the citizens of Dubrovnik for their hospitality (“Vos me singulari amore estis prosecuti...” and later on: *Nunquam enim me illius humanitatis capiet oblivio, qua me profecto non in parva totius Italiae atque propria calamitate constitutum ut filium complexi estis*”).

In this work, Dragišić starts the debate over one very frequent scholastic issue ie. angelology. He looks at the question of existence, numbers of angels, way in which they work, especially with regard to men etc. Although it may seem at first sight that in this work of an explicitly theological significance Dragišić argues in a totally scholastic manner, the fact is that in it we can notice some utterly new accents and some new questions, which become important during his time, announcing the change of horizon of the question about traditional ontologico-theological issues. Besides, in the introductory part of this debate Dragišić points out that he will introduce some new opinions and new ways of saying (“Tres namque praecipuae iuniorum theologorum docendi viae: Quicquid inquam hac in re ab his omnibus egregie dictum est hic reperiens, pleraque ab aliis intacta tractavimus, *modos novos novasque opiniones* addidimus, *novum dicendi genus secuti sumus*”). We find this *novum*, as can be recognized with Dragišić (and those parts of the text are most interesting philosophically), at the beginning and the end of the text. Those parts of the text reveal an undisputably neoplatonic influence on Dragišić (thus in the first chapters where he discusses “de angelica natura”

ie. “de substantia ipsius” starts from the question whether there exists anything cognizable that is not comprehended since God and nature do nothing in vain; Benignus in this matter proves: “Illud sequitur ut si res ulla intelligibilis a creato intellectu non intelligatur, frustra etiam sit creata ita probo.” From the fact that there are many kinds of things that people do not comprehend he draws a conclusion that it was necessary to create some “intellects superordinated to human intellect.” Being and nature, the substance of angels are of special interest to him in connection to and in regard to man, which is particularly emphasised in the chapters in which he discusses prophecies, predictions (“vaticinia, oracula, apparitiones”) that are by angels.

In the final part of his treatise, he is especially interested in the question how angels can even act on bodily things (“quo pacto angeli praesident rebus corporalibus”), which interest him, as he explicitly points out because of their actions “erga nos homines”. Here he deals with the question of miracles (“miracula”) performed by angels, the question of the way in which they can enlighten man. The fact that the most cited author in this work is undoubtedly Dionysius Areopagita (most of all his works *De divinis nominibus* and *De coelesti chierarchia*) serves as a proof of the neoplatonic influence, even though in the introductory part of the text he names other theological authorities, whose attitudes he relies upon (thus he names Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scot, Bonaventura, Henricus Gandavensis. Besides, the work had been written in the form of dialogue (which takes place between Dragišić and Ragusa noblemen and humanists).

6. The Problem of Authorship of *Apocalipsis Nova*

The authorship of one work is doubted, even though some historians of philosophy ascribe it to Dragišić – this being a treatise *Apocalipsis Nova*. It seems that the work which announces the arrival of the Pope reformer who will restore Christian unity, the coming of the millennial peace, and in which numerous allusions to the reformation of the Church are present, was originally written by beatus Amadeo. It seems that Dragišić came in possession of the original, thanks to cardinal Caravajalo, the patron of Amadeo’s followers, the so called Amadeits. Dragišić, most probably changed Amadeo’s text into a theological treatise. That this was the case (also supported by Cesare Vasoli, who writes in great length about this in his work *Profezia e ragione*) speaks the fact that the treatise which is today known under the title *Apocalipsis nova* is thematically totally in accordance with everything that was of permanent interest to Dragišić. The letters that Dragišić sent around 1500 to Ubertino Risalito, a collocutor in the dialogue in *Prophetic Solutions*, support the thesis about Dragišić’s authorship.

7. Logical Writings

An important place in the framework of Dragišić's total work take those on logics. Dragišić explains his logic in works *Dialectica nova secundum mentem Doctoris subtilis et Beati Thomae Aquinatis aliorunq̄ue realistarum* (1488), in a 1489 reprinted edition *Volumen de dialectica nova...*, and in *Artis dialecticae praecepta vetera et nova* (1520). According to Stjepan Zimmermann, Dragišić first published his logic in 1480 under the title *Dialectica nova secundum mentem Scoti et B. Thomae Aquinatis*. Bazilije Pandžić holds, however, that the first printed work by Juraj Dragišić in the field of logic, published in Florence, 1488, under title *Dialectica nova secundum mentem Doctoris Subtilis et Beati Thomae Aquinatis aliorunq̄ue realistarum*. He does not mention the 1480 edition, but only the second edition dedicated to Lorenzo de Medici's sons.

In presenting some basic characteristics of Dragišić's logic, we should take into account some of the characteristics of logics in general ie. textbooks and teachings of logics in schools and at universities of his time. Humanism brought certain changes in the approach to logic and its definition. Logics as a discipline starts to include those areas which until then had not entered logics corpus, ie. corpus of classical logics works which were all based on Aristotel's logics, and which included the so called "logica antiqua" and "logica nova" and had been used throughout the Middle Ages. Logics had been more and more permeated by elements of (mostly Cicero) rethorics, which became prominent in first "humanistic" logics (eg. Georgius Trapezuntius, who in his work *De re dialectica* tries to reconcile Cicero's rethorics with Aristotelian logics.) Humanism also brought an extensive translation, thanks to which many Aristotle's logical treatises unknown to the Middle ages had been translated. Problematics on logics is widened by thematics of those Aristotel's treatises which up until then had not entered the so called logics corpus. In Dragišić's time the best known works of logics character were *Summulae Logicales* by Peter of Spain, written in 13th century and logical works by Paul of Venice (*Logica Pauli Venetio*, published in Venice, in 1488).

In his logics, which is primarily a debate over dialectical skill, according to Roman edition 1520 in the introductory part he points out how dialectics seems to him to be "dignissima" and most suitable for the man "who by nature was endowed to come to conclusion by open debate ("ratio ipsa disserendi quam dialecticem vocant, semper mihi dignissima visa est et homini, cui a natura tributum est ut pervio discursu ad metam perveniat conclusionis, accomodatissima"). It is "moderatrix ac magistra hominis". It is "clavis omnium scientiarum" ("key to all sciences"). In the introduction, Dragišić points out how he follows Aristotle in everything, trying however, in presenting "aspera in vias planas converti ac redigere", thus attempting to make Aristotle more clear. It is interesting to name Dragišić's attitude by which

“many truths that had not been in previous centuries are now awoken, brought to light”. They are new by themselves, but old by principles out of which they arise. Then Dragišić teaches on the definition of logics and its parts, especially dialectics, on the problem of relation and demarcation of the subject matter of logics and other philosophical disciplines, on notion, on proposition, on syllogism. Here he takes into account the works that traditionally belonged to school literature on logics, and works by Lamberto d’Auxerre. Arab philosophers influence also can be noticed. Dragišić’s logics as “ars dialectica” contains “old logics” (“logica vetus”, ie. the categories and learning on proposition”) and “new logics” (“logica nova”, *Analytics* and *Topics*). “Old” and “new” logics correspond to that “praecepta vetera et nova” from the title of the third Roman edition, 1520. In this connection, “praecepta” of the new logics mostly refer to teaching on term (*terminus*). Dragišić himself is closer to champions of the so called terminological logics.

8. Concluding Remarks

To conclude on Dragišić and his role in the European spiritual history: because of his fervor with which he always approached the phenomenon of the prophecy, the issue of predestination, God’s prescience and the possibility of human freedom, out of his permanent preoccupation with different manifestations of the prophetic and above all tolerant attitude towards different forms of divination, even towards astrology, we may conclude that he was a man of his time, which means of a turning point in which there were only some barely visible tendencies that will be expressed fully in the mid 16th century. His intellectual ruminations, and his attitudes towards some important intellectual events in which he actively participated, manifest some important characteristics of one significant moment of European history, which was in regard to an utter intellectual and socio-political uncertainty, was a fertile ground for the expansion of different forms of divinations from astrological to Savonarolian, conditioned by all present sense of uncertainty and awareness of the necessity of restoration and reformation.

Regardless of the fact that his life and even his works have been examined to a great extent, however, some important questions, like the one on the influence of the Florentine platonic circle on the formation of his attitudes, especially in the above mentioned defenses, still remain open and thus present an impetus for a further detailed investigation.

9. Dragišić's Works

In manuscript

- *Defensorium Bessarionis* (Dragišić mentions it in his work *De natura angelica*)
- *In logicam introductorium* (Dragišić mentions it in his work *De libertate et immutabilitate Dei*)
- *De libertate et immutabilitate Dei*
- *De animae regni principe*
- *De communicatione divinae naturae*
- *De natura angelica*
- *Commentaria in llibros sententiarum*
- *Liber de rapti*
- *De Gratia* and some less important works

Published works

- *Dialectica nova secundum mentem doctoris subtilis et Beati Thomae Aquinatis aliorumque realistarum*, Florence, 1488.
- *Mirabilia LXXVII*, Florence, 1489.
- *Propheticae solutiones*, Florence, 1497.
- *De natura coelestium spirituum quos angelos vocamus*, Florence, 1499.
- *Defensio praestantissimi viri Ioannis Reuchlin*, probably Cologne, 1517.
- *Artis dialecticae praecepta*, Rome, 1520.

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**Hrvatski filozofi II: Juraj Dragišić
– Georgius Benignus de Salviatis (ca. 1445–1520)**

ERNA BANIĆ-PAJNIĆ

SAŽETAK: U članku se donosi prikaz života i rada filozofskog i teološkog pisca Jurja Dragišića, kao jednog od najznačajnijih i najutjecajnijih hrvatskih filozofa 15. i 16. stoljeća. Nakon kratkog prikaza njegove sveučilišne i crkvene karijere, razmatraju se pojedina Dragišićeva djela u kojima on raspravlja o nizu filozofskih, teoloških i logičkih pitanja poput problema autentičnosti proročanstava, slobodi volje, obnovi kršćanstva, logici i dijalektičkoj vještini itd. Zaključno se ističe da je Dragišić, ne samo svojim djelima, nego i crkvenim i političkim angažmanom, predstavljao pravog čovjeka svog vremena koje u intelektualnom smislu anticipira tendencije koje će do punog izražaja doći sredinom 16. stoljeća.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Juraj Dragišić, humanizam, renesansna filozofija, sloboda volje, autentičnost proročanstava, aristotelovska logika, obnova kršćanstva.
