prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle
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Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle
International journal of philosophical studies, 29 (2021), 3; 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790
Grgić, Filip

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Grgić, F. (2021). Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle. International journal of philosophical studies, 29. (3), 351-369. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić, Filip. "Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle." International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 29, br. 3, 2021, str. 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić, Filip. "Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle." International journal of philosophical studies 29, br. 3 (2021): 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić, F. (2021) 'Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle', International journal of philosophical studies, 29(3), str. 351-369. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić F. Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle. International journal of philosophical studies [Internet]. 2021. [pristupljeno 17.11.2024.];29(3):351-369. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

F. Grgić, "Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle", International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 29, br. 3, str. 351-369, 2021. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:783326. [Citirano: 17.11.2024.]

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Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle
AutorFilip Grgić
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions). I argue that involuntary actions that come about because of ignorance are painful for basically the same reason as forced actions. They include the mismatch between the person’s capacity as the agent and the fact that it happened to her that she did something even though, qua agent, she contributed nothing, so that she is reduced, as it were, to the mere vehicle of luck.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran - međunarodna recenzija
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaInternational journal of philosophical studies
Brojčani podacivol. 29, br. 3, str. 351-369
p-ISSN0967-2559
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:783326
Datum objave publikacije2021
URL dokumentahttp://bib.irb.hr/1143804
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaInstitucijski pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2023-03-20 10:00:02