Among contemporary philosophers of science and philosophers of biology, the debates about the relation between the Danvinian theory of evolution and classical ethics became highly sophisticated with clearly delineated research areas. Among philosophers and ethicists not specializing in evolutionary theory, however, there is a common tendency to use the term 'evolutionary ethics' in a sense that is often too wide and undetermined. Yet, one should divide the historical development of evolutionary ethics into at least two distinct stages: the first stage that, broadly speaking, encompasses the period from the occurrence of Darmn's theory to the mid 20th century, and the second stage that encompasses the period from the occurrence of socio-biology in the 1970ies to the present. The primary objective of this article is to show why and how these two stages of evolutionary ethics (despite common philosophical tendency to envisage them as two parts of one unique whole) should nevertheless be strictly distinguished, particularly by emphasizing their distinctive scientific and philosophical (ethical) features. After the introductory definition of evolutionary ethics and the illustration of the basic philosophical and methodological disputes that surround it, follows the analysis of the first stage of evolutionary ethics. This stage of evolutionary ethics characterizes primarily Danvin's attempt at explaining human moral nature by employing some basic principles of his evolutionary theory, and especially Herbert Spencer 's views, according to which certain moral guidance is inherent in the general (cosmic) evolutionary process. What follows is the analysis of the second stage of evolutionary ethics that is built upon socio-biological explanations of human (kin and reciprocal) altruism, which in turn provided basis for some specific modem day versions of evolutionary ethics, like the one offered by Michael Ruse. In its final section, the article summarizes distinctive scientific and philosophical features of both stages of evolutionary ethics, highlights the fact that evolutionary ethics is not one unique project, and points out that this fact should not be neglected if we want our theoretical assessments of evolutionary ethics (be they positive or negative) to be taken seriously.