| Abstract (croatian) | Središte Petrićeve kritike, interpretacije Aristotelove filozofije predstavlja Petrićevo tumačenje Aristotelova određenja znanosti, posebno predmeta Metafizike. Petrić želi dokazati da je znanost, a u okviru Aristotelova učenja, u sebi kontradiktorna. Aristotel ne određuje adekvatno predmet znanosti kao oύσία Aristotelove znanstvene metode otvaraju tek područje doksičkog, Aristotelova podjela znanosti (osobito teorijskih znanosti) neprihvatljiva je ako se kritički preispita. Aristotelovu znanost utvrđuje Petrić u cjelini kao mnijenje (δόξα). Kako se cijela Petrićeva interpretacija Aristotela vodi u horizontu »kršćanske filozofije«, u horizontu mogućeg odnosa između razuma (aristotelizma) i vjere, nameće se i slijedeći zaključak: Petrić tumačeći Aristotelovu filozofiju, znanost kao mnijenje svodi kršćanski utvrđen odnos razuma i vjere na odnos mnijenja i vjere. S obzirom na potrebu novog određenja razuma - kao znanosti, a ne mnijenja - zahtijeva se i nova interpretacija odnosa razuma i vjere.
Ta, doduše, u tom smislu ne posve jasno eksplicirana Petrićeva misao pokazuje se ujedno kao najspornija u okviru kršćanskog mišljenja. Iako neeksplicirana, ona je, svakako, na određen način i samom Petriću sporna jer je Petrić nastoji prikazati prihvatljivom jednim postupkom koji se u ovom radu pokušava imenovati kao »aristoteliziranje platonizma«. U tom smislu, tj. kao »aristoteliziranje platonizma« može se, svakako, tumačiti i Petrićevo tumačenje Aristotelova plagijata, odnosno njegov pokušaj integriranja pojedinih Aristotelovih učenja u platonizam, no prije svega njegova interpretacija po kojoj se vrijednost (tj. istinitost) Platonova učenja (predsokratovskog i »starog« koje Petrić shvaća u jedinstvu tradicije istinite i vječne filozofije) pokazuje upravo na temelju vlastitih Aristotelovih načela.
Centralno mjesto u tom sklopu predstavlja Petrićeva interpretacija Aristotelove Metafizike.
Petrić prije svega konstatira da Metafizika nije jedna znanost, da nema jedinstven predmet, nego da je konglomerat više znanosti. Jedinstvenost predmeta Metafizike nije postignuta - čak ni intendirana. Budući da nije jedna znanost, ne može imati niti jedno ime. S obzirom na to da jedan dio Metafizike (neke knjige) raspravlja o predmetima koji su prije prirodnih stvari (po dignitetu) - taj dio bi se mogao zvati »Antefizika«. Druge knjige raspravljaju o biću kao biću i njih naziva Petrić: »De ente« - (Znanost) O biću. Težište svog raspravljanja postavlja pak Petrić na dokazivanje nemogućnosti jedinstva između antefizike i de ente, nemogućnosti da to dvoje bude jedna znanost. Nemogućnost tog jedinstva zasniva se, međutim, upravo na vlastitoj Aristotelovoj koncepciji, na njegovim originalnim tezama.
Osnovna teza na kojoj se temelji nejedinstvo Metafizike, nemogućnost postojanja znanosti metafizike u Metafizici je, po Petriću, Aristotelovo učenje po kojem je biće kao biće - najopćenitiji pojam, ono općenito skupljeno iz pojedinačnog na temelju apstrakcije. Biće kao biće, najopćenitiji pojam,pokazuje se Petriću kao ens rationis, odnosno ne-realno biće. Takvo ne-realno biće ne može s predmetom antefizike (mudrosti - Aristotel) kao realnim i nadprirodnim predmetom predstavljati jedinstvenu predmetnost jedne znanosti. Naprotiv, biće kao biće u platoničkom smislu kao istinsko ili uistinu biće, tj. ideja (a ne opći pojam) isto je što i nad-prirodno ili prije-prirodno biće i s njime predstavlja jednu jedinstvenu (i znanstvenu) predmetnost. Petrić je u svojem tumačenju Aristotelova određenja bića kao bića kao najopćenitijeg pojma s jedne strane u antitezi prema antičkim i većini srednjovjekovnih komentatora Aristotela, s druge strane nadovezuje se na nominalističku interpretaciju. U cjelini svojeg izvođenja i s obzirom na (pretpostavljenu) intenciju: »aristoteliziranje platonizma« - Petrić je originalan. |
| Abstract (english) | The focus of Petrić's critique, an interpretation of Aristotele's philosophy, represent's Petrić's interpretation of Aristotle's definition of science, especially the subject of Metaphysics. Petrić intends to prove that science, within the framework of Aristotle's study, is itself contradictory. Aristotle does not define an adequate subject of science as Aristotle's scientific methods merely open the field of the doxic, Aristotle's division of science (especially theoretical sciences) is unacceptable if examined critically.
Petrić establishes Aristotle's science as a whole as opinion (δόξα).Since Petrić's entire interpretation of Aristotle leads towards the horizon of »Christian philosophy«, towards a horizon of a possible relation between reason (Aristotlism) and faith, the following conclusion arises: Petrić, by interpreting Aristotle's philosophy, is reducing science as an opinion (mnijenje) to a Christianly established relationship of reason and faith to the relationship of opinion and faith. With regard for the need of a new definition of reason - as science and not opinion – a new interpretation is sought for the relation between reason and faith.
This thought of Petrić's, which is not utterly explicated, seems at the same time to be the most contested within the framework of Christian thinking. Although unexplicated, it is certainly disputable even to Petrić himself, in a sense, because Petrić is trying to present it using an acceptable procedure which we attempt to define in this paper as »aristotleization of Platonism«. In this sense, i. e. as »aristotleization of Platonism« one can, certainly, interpret Petrić's interpretation of Aristotle's plagiate, i. e. his attempt at integrating Aristotle's individual teachings into Platonism, but first of all we have interpretation according to which value (i. e. truthfulness) of Plato's studies (pre-Socratic and »old« that Petrić grasps as a unity of tradition of truthful nd eternal philosophy) are shown on the basis of Aristotle's own principles.
The central position in this complex is held by Petrić's interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Petrić first contends that Metaphysics is not a single science, that it does not have a single subject, rather that it is a conglomerate of several sciences. No cohesion of subject is achieved in Metaphysics - and it is not even intended. Since it is not a single science, it can not have a single name. And since one part of Metaphysics (some of the volumes) debate on subjects that are before natural things (in dignity) - this part could be called »Antephysics«. The second books debate on the being as a being and they are called, by Petrić: »De ente« (Knowledge) On the Being. Petrić places the brunt of his debate on proving the impossibi1ity of cohesion between antephysics and de ente, the impossibility of these two being a single science. The impossibi1ity of this cohesion is based, however, on Aristotle's own concept, on his original theses.
The basic thesis on which the lack of cohesion in Metaphysics is based, the impossibility of the existence of a science of metaphysics in Metaphysics is, in Petrić's opinion, Aristot1e's teaching according to which the being as being - is the most universal concept, the universal gathered from the individual on the basis of abstraction. The being as being, the most universal concept, seems to Petrić as ens rationis, that is the non-real being. Such a non-real being can not, with the subject of antephysics (wisdom - Aristotle) as a real and supernatural subject, represent the cohesive subject of a single science. To the contrary, the being as being in the Platonic sense as a truthful of real being, i. e. an idea (and not a general concept) is the same as the super-natural or ante-natural being and with it represents a cohesive (and scientific) subject.
In his interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the being as being as the most universal concept, in antithesis on the one hand towards the antique and most of the medieval commentators on Aristotle, on the other hand he is building on a nomina1ist interpretation. In the totality of his deduction and with regards to the (postulated) intention - the »Aristotelization of Platonism«, Petrić is original. |
