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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism
Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, 9 (2010), 2; 287-293. urn:nbn:hr:261:832214
Pećnjak, Davor

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Pećnjak, D. (2010). Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism. Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, 9. (2), 287-293. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:832214

Pećnjak, Davor. "Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism." Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 287-293. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:832214

Pećnjak, Davor. "Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism." Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju 9, no. 2 (2010): 287-293. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:832214

Pećnjak, D. (2010) 'Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism', Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, 9(2), pp. 287-293. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:832214 (Accessed 18 November 2024)

Pećnjak D. Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism. Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju [Internet]. 2010 [cited 2024 November 18];9(2):287-293. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:832214

D. Pećnjak, "Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism", Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 287-293, 2010. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:832214. [Accessed: 18 November 2024]

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Metadata
Title (english)Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism
AuthorDavor Pećnjak
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
In this article I defend Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism in O'Connor's version against several objections raised by David Widerker. More specifically, I try to show that we can overcome difficulties raised by the question whether an agent has a control over controlling doing action E, by objection of possible nomically sufficient condition for obtaining of E and by objection of possible logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for obtaining of E.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review - international
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleProlegomena : Časopis za filozofiju
Numberingvol. 9, no. 2, pp. 287-293
p-ISSN1333-4395
e-ISSN1846-0593
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:832214
Publication2010
ProjectNumber: 191-0091328-1091
Title (croatian): Pitanje slobode volje i problem svijesti
Title (english): Question About Free Will and the Problem of Consciousness
Leader: Davor Pećnjak
Jurisdiction: Croatia
Funding stream: ZP
Document URLhttp://prolegomena.upf.hr/browse-archive/vol._16_2017/no._1/#wpfb-cat-52
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2021-05-26 11:42:15