prikaz prve stranice dokumenta The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning
  Download
PDF 1.8 MB
Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX (2009), 25; 91-100. urn:nbn:hr:261:541187
Sušnik, Matej

Cite this document

Sušnik, M. (2009). The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX. (25), 91-100. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

Sušnik, Matej. "The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. IX, no. 25, 2009, pp. 91-100. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

Sušnik, Matej. "The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning." Croatian Journal of Philosophy IX, no. 25 (2009): 91-100. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

Sušnik, M. (2009) 'The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX(25), pp. 91-100. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187 (Accessed 16 November 2024)

Sušnik M. The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2009 [cited 2024 November 16];IX(25):91-100. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

M. Sušnik, "The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. IX, no. 25, pp. 91-100, 2009. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187. [Accessed: 16 November 2024]

Please login to the repository to save this object to your list.
Metadata
Title (english)The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning
AuthorMatej Sušnik
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’ s refutation of Hare’ s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’ s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’ s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also poses a threat to the method of reflective equilibrium. At the end of the paper, I consider another view of moral reasoning which, in my view, is better suited to deal with the amoralist objection.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review - international
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Numberingvol. IX, no. 25, pp. 91-100
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:541187
Publication2009
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2021-04-22 10:20:36