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Scientific paper - Review paper
Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will
Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, 19 (2020), 1; 77-90. https://doi.org/10.26362/20200105
Anić, Zvonimir; Pećnjak, Davor

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Anić, Z. & Pećnjak, D. (2020). Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will. Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, 19. (1), 77-90. doi: 10.26362/20200105

Anić, Zvonimir and Davor Pećnjak. "Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will." Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, vol. 19, no. 1, 2020, pp. 77-90. https://doi.org/10.26362/20200105

Anić, Zvonimir and Davor Pećnjak. "Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will." Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju 19, no. 1 (2020): 77-90. https://doi.org/10.26362/20200105

Anić, Z. and Pećnjak, D. (2020) 'Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will', Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, 19(1), pp. 77-90. doi: 10.26362/20200105

Anić Z, Pećnjak D. Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will. Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju [Internet]. 2020 February 20 [cited 2024 November 16];19(1):77-90. doi: 10.26362/20200105

Z. Anić and D. Pećnjak, "Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will", Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 77-90, February 2020. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:506908. [Accessed: 16 November 2024]

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Metadata
Title (english)Free will, Causation and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will
AuthorZvonimir Anić
AuthorDavor Pećnjak
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
No matter what side one takes in the debate about free will, one will also have to accept certain metaphysical assumptions about causation and causal laws and, consequently, posit a certain ontological framework. In Causation and Free Will, Sartorio develops a compatibilist, actual causal sequence account of free will which is grounded on certain controversial features that causation presumably has. In this paper, we argue that those features cannot be jointly incorporated adequately into any plausible philosophical account of causation regardless of the validity of the thesis of causal determinism, and that they work against one another in Sartorio’s account of free will. We argue that no philosophical account of free will can establish the freedom of the will without offering a plausible answer of how an agent can have a grip on causation.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Review paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleProlegomena : Časopis za filozofiju
Numberingvol. 19, no. 1, pp. 77-90
p-ISSN1333-4395
e-ISSN1846-0593
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.26362/20200105
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:506908
Publication2020-02-20
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2021-03-15 12:13:55