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# Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism

Filip Grgić

*Abstract:* Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not possible. The main obstacle to characterizing Pyrrhonism as both investigative and suspensive is the fact that it seems that the mature sceptics, after they have suspended judgement and thus reached tranquillity, have no motivation for further inquiry. Any inquiry they seem to be interested in after they have suspended judgement is the refutation of (relevant) beliefs needed for maintaining tranquillity. I try to show that the mature sceptics' removal of distress does not *ipso facto* mean removal of the desire for knowledge. This is because distress is not just a matter of unsatisfied desire, but of belief that one of the opposed appearances must be true, or, more generally, of belief that the truth is the only worthwhile epistemic goal. Having abandoned this belief, the sceptics can still engage in philosophical inquiries. This is because Sextus does not assume that philosophy is the search for truth: it is so only for the dogmatists. In a more general sense, applicable to the sceptics as well, philosophy is just an inquiry into certain things, and for the sceptics, its epistemic goal is still open.

There is a notorious problem with Sextus Empiricus' account of Pyrrhonian scepticism. On the one hand, he portrays the Pyrrhonists as inquirers or examiners (*skeptikoi*), and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. Such a view is most conspicuously presented at the very beginning of his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*:

When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery, or a denial of discovery and a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. This, no doubt, is why in the case of philosophical investigations, too, some have said that they have discovered the truth, some have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating. Those who are called dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth—for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others. The schools of Clitomachus and Carneades,

and other Academics, have asserted that things cannot be apprehended. And the sceptics are still investigating. (*PH* 1.1–3)<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Sextus says that the Pyrrhonists came to search for the truth in order to achieve tranquillity (*ataraxia*), which followed when they suspended judgement (1.26, 29). He insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything, that is, withholding beliefs about how things really are, and just following the ways in which they appear. Thus, the Pyrrhonian sceptics are portrayed by Sextus in two radically different ways—as persistent inquirers and as suspenders of judgement—and the natural, and widely discussed, question is if it is possible to give a unified account of Sextan scepticism. More precisely, there are two principal problems with Sextus' characterization of Pyrrhonism. First, on what grounds can he claim, in the quotation above, that it is their being engaged in perpetual inquiry, and not its outcome, that distinguishes the Pyrrhonists from the others? Second, how to consistently ascribe both features of Pyrrhonism to mature sceptics,<sup>2</sup> that is, to those who claim to have achieved tranquillity through suspension of judgement and who thus seem to lack any motivation for further inquiry? Many have argued that such a consistent account is not possible, and that Sextan scepticism should be seen not as investigative, but as suspensive scepticism. The consequence of such a view is that we should be suspicious of calling Sextan scepticism a kind of philosophy at all, despite the fact that this is how Sextus describes it.<sup>3</sup> Thus Jonathan Barnes: '[S]ince an emeritus professor is no longer a professor, surely a sceptical philosopher is no longer a philosopher. Sextan scepticism is not a philosophy: it is a retirement from philosophy'.<sup>4</sup>

Even though there are some strong reasons that speak in favour of such a conclusion (some of which I will survey in Section I), I believe that there also reasons to be more sympathetic to Sextus. To see what these reasons might be, I will take a closer look at what are, according to Sextus, the main sources of distress (Section II), and draw some distinctions about the notion of suspension of judgement (Section III). Finally (Section IV), I will argue that there is, after all, a sense in which Sextan scepticism is both suspensive and investigative, though I admit that this requires a somewhat charitable (I hope not too charitable) reading of Sextus.

## I

Sextus says that while the dogmatists have asserted that they have discovered the truth, the sceptics are still investigating. There are two distinct but related problems with this. First, why would Sextus want to deny the dogmatists the title of inquirers, given that they are apparently engaged in inquiries no less than the Pyrrhonists? Second, how can he claim that the sceptics 'are still investigating', given that he also says that they suspend judgement about everything?

Sextus' suggestion that the dogmatists are not inquirers may be taken to mean that they are so conceited to claim that they have discovered every true proposition there is and that philosophy is completed. Or, alternatively, his point may be that the dogmatists think that they have discovered all general and basic truths, as, for instance, the Epicureans think that they have discovered that atomism is true. Now, while it is true that Sextus shows a remarkable lack of interest in current philosophical movements,<sup>5</sup> which may prompt one to think that he is really suggesting something along these lines, it is nevertheless unlikely that this is what he has in mind in the opening of the *Outlines*. For, he cannot deny that there are dogmatic philosophers around him doing some research, and even though he may believe that contemporary dogmatists are convinced that they have found all general and basic truths, he cannot deny that they are engaged in particular investigations of the details of their doctrines.

So perhaps what Sextus is suggesting is this: For any  $p$  that has been the object of philosophical inquiry, and about which the dogmatists have asserted that they have discovered whether it is true or false, the sceptics are still investigating whether it is true or false. Taken at face value, however, this will not do, since our problem is precisely the fact that, according to Sextus' account of mature sceptics, it seems that 'are still investigating whether it is true or false' should be substituted by 'are suspending judgement whether it is true or false'. A further possibility is that Sextus wants to suggest that while the dogmatists have firmly asserted that  $p$  is true or false, and thus concluded their inquiries, the Pyrrhonists are inquirers because even though they have suspended judgement, they are *open* for further inquiry. Now, it is true that the Pyrrhonists' attitude toward the outcome of their inquiry differs from the attitude of other philosophers insofar as the Pyrrhonists strongly qualify their suspension and admit that it is only provisional.<sup>6</sup> They only assert that as far as their current intellectual capacities are concerned, or as far as the arguments they have scrutinized thus far are concerned, they are forced to suspend judgement. Thus, they admit that they are open to the possibility that there are some further decisive arguments in favour of  $p$ 's truth or falsity, and that when someone presents these arguments, they will examine them carefully, ready to abandon their suspension if needed. This, however, cannot make the Pyrrhonists inquirers in the relevant sense, since this is not what Sextus says at the beginning of the *Outlines*: he says that they are *still investigating* (*eti zētousin*), not that they are able to investigate. Moreover, he makes it clear that the Pyrrhonists are called inquirers in virtue of their inquiring activity (*energeia*, 1.7), not in virtue of their readiness to inquire. Readiness to inquire even after the goal of inquiry has been achieved may be an important intellectual virtue, but it is not peculiar to the Pyrrhonists: it is a virtue of every serious and responsible inquirer.

A further possibility is that the Pyrrhonists are inquirers because they are constantly engaged in showing how to suspend judgement. They act as doctors, and they have a philanthropic commitment to remove the ailments that beset those—both doctrinal philosophers and ordinary people—who

assent precipitately to alleged truths.<sup>7</sup> Thus, before they have discovered that tranquillity supervenes on suspension of judgement, they were engaged in inquiry into truth; afterwards, their inquiry took the form of therapy. Hence, they always inquire further than the dogmatists, since they are trying to demonstrate that for every proposition that has been accepted by the dogmatists as true there is an equally convincing proposition, which induces one to suspend judgement.

Such an account is to a certain degree undeniably correct. Yet Sextus himself implies that Pyrrhonism is more than just a therapy. For instance, in the passage quoted from the beginning of the *Outlines* he speaks of inquiry and *discovery* (*heuresis*), and suggests that the Pyrrhonists are engaged in the same kind of activity as other philosophers.<sup>8</sup> Consider further what he says about the nomenclature of scepticism:

The sceptical way, then, is also called [1] Investigative (*zētētikē*), from its activity in investigating (*zētein*) and inquiring (*skeptesthai*); [2] Suspensive (*ephektikē*), from the affection (*pathos*) that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation. [3] Aporetic, either [3a] (as some say) from the fact that it puzzles over (*aporein*) and investigates everything, or else [3b] from its being at a loss (*amēchanein*) whether to assent or deny; and [4] Pyrrhonian, from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have attached himself to scepticism more systematically and conspicuously than anyone before him. (1.7)

Apparently, [1] is the same characterization as the one at the beginning of the *Outlines*. Presumably, [2] and [3b] refer to the same kind of mental state, as suspension of judgement is 'standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything' (1.10), or a state in which the intellect 'is suspended so as neither to posit nor to reject anything' (1.196), which seems to amount to the same as being at a loss whether to assent or deny. As for [3a], by saying that scepticism puzzles over everything Sextus perhaps has in mind the sceptical procedure of setting out oppositions, in which every proposition is refuted by opposing to it an equipollent proposition.<sup>9</sup> Hence, if we put aside the historical title [4], we are left with the characterization of scepticism as suspensive ([2], [3b]) and investigative, and the latter divides further into investigative in a wider, unspecified sense (the beginning of *PH*, [1]) and investigative in the sense of 'refutative' ([3a]). A similar dual conception of scepticism is perhaps found at the beginning of *Against the Logicians* (*M* 7.1), where Sextus describes the sceptics' activity as, on the one hand, 'inquiring about things on our own' and, on the other, 'rebutting the dogmatists'. While it is not immediately clear what exactly he has in mind, he obviously implies that rebutting is only a part of the sceptical inquiry, and not the whole of it.

Thus, at least some texts suggest that there is more to sceptical inquiry than inducing suspension through refutation. Such a dual characterization of sceptical inquiry can perhaps be seen as a matter of the way in which Sextus presents scepticism. While he is obviously aware of the important differences

that exist between various stages in the history of Pyrrhonism, he nevertheless, especially in the opening chapters of the *Outlines*, gives a basically ahistorical account. We should note, however, that his account applies to at least three groups of Pyrrhonists, which differ either historically or in respect of their status within the school, and some features that Sextus ascribes to Pyrrhonism as such belong to it because they actually belong to some one of these groups. First, some of his statements apply to the founders of Pyrrhonian movement, or proto-sceptics, who were the first to embark upon sceptical inquiry in the hope of attaining tranquillity by finding the truth (1.12; 1.26, quoted below). Second, there are mature sceptics, who suspend judgement about everything and hence enjoy the life of tranquillity. Finally, there are those who may be called the would-be sceptics, that is, those who join the Pyrrhonist movement and are yet to achieve tranquillity. Thus, it may be said that Sextus in 1.7 ascribes to Pyrrhonism, atemporally, characteristics that actually belong to various stages of its history and to various groups within the school. The Pyrrhonists were first, say at the beginning of their movement in the fourth century BC, inquirers into truth (note the past tense in *PH* 1.12, 26; *M* 1.6, quoted partly below); then they suspended judgement ([2]), achieved tranquillity, and thus became the mature sceptics; the later generations of Pyrrhonists, both the mature sceptics and the would-be sceptics who want to achieve tranquillity, are engaged in refutations ([3a]), which also result in the state of puzzlement or suspension ([3b])—hence, [1]–[3b] cannot all be ascribed to a mature sceptic. That is to say, the Pyrrhonists are both inquirers and suspenders of judgement because they *were* inquirers into truth and *are* now suspenders of judgement engaged in refutative inquiry.

There are some serious difficulties with such a reading. It does not explain why Sextus opens the *Outlines* in the way he does, by picking out inquiry as the dominant feature of Pyrrhonism. For, 'inquiry' in 1.1–3 certainly does not refer to the activity of refutation. It cannot refer to the *proto-sceptics'* activity of searching for truth either, since Sextus cannot deny that other groups of philosophers *were* also engaged in such an activity. His point may be that Pyrrhonism is the only truly investigative philosophy because its history comprises both main kinds of inquiry: searching for truth and refutation. This would mean, however, that he wants to suggest that the dogmatists are not engaged in refuting each others' (and the sceptics') doctrines; but there is no obvious reason for such a suggestion.<sup>10</sup> Besides, according to such an explanation, the mature sceptics are unconcerned about finding the truth simply because of their predecessors' failure. So they not only retired from philosophy, but retired without ever having been engaged in the search for truth.

While I do not claim that such a reading is entirely wrong, I believe that it is possible to offer a more attractive account. Presumably, the main obstacle to characterizing the mature sceptics as persistent inquirers into truth is the assumption that the Pyrrhonists are interested exclusively in achievement of tranquillity. Hence, an important step toward providing a coherent interpretation of Pyrrhonian scepticism as both suspensive and investigative would consist in

showing that the Pyrrhonists have an interest in inquiry that is independent of their interest in achieving tranquillity.<sup>11</sup> To see whether such an interest can be found, let me first take a closer look at what are, according to Sextus, the main sources of distress.

## II

There are two main sources of distress that can be discerned in Sextus' writings:

- (a) A source of distress is conflict of appearances, that is, the fact that it appears both that *p* and that not-*p*.
- (b) A source of distress is belief that something is by nature (that is, objectively or absolutely) good or bad. For, if you believe that something is by nature good, then, if you possess it, you will be distressed because you will eagerly do anything so as not to lose it; and if you do not possess it, you will be distressed because you will eagerly do anything to attain it. (Conversely if you believe that something is by nature bad.)<sup>12</sup>

Although Sextus discusses (a) and (b) within a single chapter (*PH* 1.25–30, quoted partly below) without suggesting any difference between the two accounts, they apparently differ in at least two important respects. First, they differ in respect of the role they assign to *belief* in producing distress. While belief that things have positive or negative value is the main source of distress according to (b), (a) says that you can be distressed because something appears to you in conflicting ways, regardless of whether appearances in question include beliefs or not. Second, (a) and (b) differ in respect of the fact that they require different methods to remove distress. At first glance, the (a)-type distress can be removed simply by finding the truth, that is to say, by discovering which of the conflicting appearances is true. On the other hand, (b)-type distress can be removed simply by eliminating the troublesome belief that there is something that is by nature good or bad. Thus, insofar as the Pyrrhonists' activity is seen as directed toward a goal, i.e., removal of distress, it is describable in two apparently incompatible ways: as a search for truth and as a project of eliminating a problematic class of beliefs.

One could again try to solve or, at least, alleviate this problem by arguing that it is just a matter of Sextus' ahistorical presentation of different phases in the history of Pyrrhonism. Thus one might argue that the (a)-type distress beset the proto-sceptics, who tried to remove it by finding the truth, while the (b)-type is characteristic of dogmatic philosophers and ordinary people, who are hence subjects of the mature sceptics' therapy. Even though there is no single type of distress and of the method of its removal that has been in the focus of Pyrrhonism throughout its history, it does make sense to say that the main characteristic of Pyrrhonism is that it aims at achieving tranquillity through inquiry.

That something like this is indeed Sextus' strategy might be concluded from the manner in which he organizes his discussion of the goal of scepticism in *PH* 1.26–9:

[1] For sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil; but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgement. And when they suspended judgement, tranquillity in matters of opinion followed fortuitously.

[2] For those who hold the opinion that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believe to be good, they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue what (so they think) is good. And when they have acquired these things, they experience more troubles; for they are elated beyond reason and measure, and in fear of change they do anything so as not to lose what they believe to be good. But those who make no determination about what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are tranquil.

[3] A story told of the painter Apelles applies to the sceptics. They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to represent in his picture the lather on the horse's mouth; but he was so unsuccessful that he gave up, took the sponge on which he had been wiping off the colours from his brush, and flung it at the picture. And when it hit the picture, it produced a representation of the horse's lather. Now the sceptics were hoping to acquire tranquillity by deciding the anomalies in what appears and is thought of, and being unable to do this they suspended judgement. But when they suspended judgement, tranquillity followed as it were fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body.

[1] and [3] are written in the past tense and apparently apply to the sceptics in the past, who were distressed because they noticed that things appear in conflicting ways. Their distress was not due to the reason stated in [2], as they did not have belief that one of the appearances of the good is true or false. On the other hand, [2] is written in the present tense and apply to dogmatic philosophers and ordinary people, whose distress is apparently not due to any conflict or anomaly, but to having definite beliefs that certain things are good or bad by nature. [2] is inserted between [1] and [3] without any obvious transition or explanation; the first sentence of [3] is a natural continuation of the last sentence of [1], and not of anything that is stated in [2]. Thus Sextus does not care to make a clear distinction between the two cases but conflates them into a single account of the sceptics' goal.

There is, however, one thing common to (a) and (b), since Sextus suggests that in both cases, the goal is not tranquillity as such, but a specific form of it, i.e. tranquillity in matters of opinion (*en tois kata doxan*, 1.25; *en tois doxastois*, 1.26,



30). Matters of opinion are things about which there is an unresolvable disagreement among both ordinary people and philosophers, and which are therefore non-evident (see, for instance, *M* 2.53). Thus, having removed the (a)- and (b)-type distress, the sceptic is not disturbed over anything that is subject to disagreement, even though he is still disturbed over things that are forced upon him (1.29). This is clear with regard to the (b)-type distress: since people disagree about what is good by nature, this is a matter of opinion, and the good is a non-evident thing. Hence, a person who has removed the (b)-type distress is undisturbed as far as this particular matter of opinion is concerned because she does not have a belief that there is anything that is by nature good. With regard to the (a)-type distress, however, this is not immediately clear: why would the removal of distress due to the conflict of appearances bring about tranquillity *in matters of opinion*? To see why this might be so, let us look more closely to what exactly is disturbing in conflict of appearances.

There are two conditions that are clearly necessary for a conflict of appearances to be described as disturbing: a person should be ignorant as to which of the appearances is true and she should have a desire to know. Thus, as Casey Perin has recently argued, '[t]he Sceptic is distressed by his failure to know whether *p* because his desire to know whether *p* is unsatisfied and an unsatisfied desire is, to one degree or another, a source of distress' (Perin 2010: 24).<sup>13</sup> Now, ignorance and desire for knowledge are undoubtedly necessary and sufficient conditions for commencing an inquiry. But are they sufficient to explain the proto-sceptics' distress? If distress is just a matter of unsatisfied desire for knowledge, then we would expect that it can be removed either through fulfilment of desire or through its abandonment. The sceptics claim to have reached tranquillity through suspension of judgement. Yet suspension is certainly not the fulfilment of desire for knowledge. It cannot be taken as its abandonment either, for several reasons. First, this would bring us back to our original problem, the mature sceptics' lack of motivation for inquiry. For, if the source of the proto-sceptics' distress is nothing but the unsatisfied desire for knowledge, and if to suspend judgement is to abandon this desire, then the mature sceptics lack motivation for inquiry. They may have a motivation to remove the (b)-type distress of other people, but this does not require anything more than refutation of their troublesome beliefs. Second, if you suspend judgement about *p* and thereby abandon your desire to know whether *p*, then this might be because you now think that this problem is unresolvable. The Pyrrhonists' suspension, however, is not to be taken as definitive and unqualified, but relative to the arguments they have scrutinized thus far. They do not think that the problems they have been considering are unresolvable, but only that they are currently not able to provide an answer. Third, given such a character of sceptical suspension, to say that suspension is abandonment of desire for knowledge is to imply that their desire and, consequently, distress can recur. It can recur as soon as some new arguments are brought forward in favour of one of the opposed appearances, which may give rise to a new desire for knowledge. This would mean, however, that tranquillity is an unstable state, and

that the sceptics must struggle to achieve it over and over again; but Sextus suggests that the sceptics have already arrived at their end that that they actually do enjoy tranquillity.<sup>14</sup>

Hence, what we need if we want scepticism that is both suspensive and investigative (in a positive sense, and not only in the sense of 'refutative') is, among other things, such an account of the proto-sceptics' distress according to which the removal of distress does not entail removal of the motivation for inquiry. We must assume that besides ignorance and desire, something else is required to account for the (a)-type distress.

Since Sextus says that the sceptics achieved tranquillity in matters of opinion, the additional source of distress is perhaps to be sought in something that is also the matter of opinion or dissent. This can presumably be found in belief that one of the conflicting appearances must be true, or that the conflict is resolvable only by finding the truth. After all, what the proto-sceptics set out to do to eliminate distress was precisely to reach the verdict or decision (cf. *epikrisis*, PH 1.12; *epikrinai*, 1.26) by finding the truth. The belief that conflict of appearances is resolvable only by discovering which of them is true is the object of strong disagreement among philosophers, since while some insist that it is necessary that one of the conflicting appearances must be true and another false (positive dogmatists), there are also some who think that it is possible that neither of them is true (e.g., atomists), or that both can be true (relativists, e.g., Protagoras), or that it is impossible to discover which one is true (negative dogmatists).

However, the proto-sceptics' opinion that truth is the only worthwhile epistemic goal does not by itself explain their distress. Likewise, the source of the (b)-type distress is not just the fact that one's belief that a certain thing is by nature good is necessarily a matter of disagreement because there are always those who oppose to it some other conception of the good. The source of the (b)-type distress is rather the upshot of this belief, that is, an intense pursuit of something that one believes is by nature good. Thus, in his discussion of (b), Sextus says that 'every distress besets people either because of their intensely pursuing certain things or because of their intensely avoiding certain things' (M 11.112), and that 'all people intensely pursue what is thought by them good and avoid what is supposed bad' (11.113, transl. Bett 1997, with modification). Even though this remark actually concerns value judgements, it is easily applicable to the (a)-type occasions of distress as well. For, suppose that it appears to you both that  $p$  and that not- $p$ , that you are ignorant as to which of them is true, and that you intensely pursue  $p$ . Sextus would say that you are distressed. Your distress is not due to your belief that  $p$  is true, as in (b) (since the assumption is that you have no belief about which of the conflicting appearances is true), but to your belief that it must be either true or false, and that it can be false. Think of a person whom it appears that pleasure is good and hence intensely pursues the life of pleasure, but is ignorant about whether it is really good and is aware of the powerful arguments to the effect that it is not good. She will be distressed only if she has a belief that it must be either good or not good, since it is only

if she has such a belief that she can be upset that her intense pursuing of pleasure could turn out to be a grave mistake.<sup>15</sup> If she holds a belief that it is undecidable whether pleasure is good, or if she is a moral relativist, she will not be distressed, and likewise if she has no belief at all. Therefore, (a) and (b) are not so dissimilar as they seem at the first sight: in both cases, the main source of distress is actually a certain kind of belief, which gives rise to a certain kind of action.

Moreover, it may seem that in both cases, the source of distress is belief that something is good or bad, and that (a) and (b) are just two different explanations of the ways in which this produces distress. Thus, in the case of (a), it may be said that the conflict of appearances is the source of distress if appearances in question include instances of a kind of thing of which a person believes that it is either good or bad. For example, if it appears to you both that a particular thing is pleasant and that it is not pleasant, you will be distressed only if you have an additional belief that pleasure is either good or bad. Sextus would then insist that even if you resolve the conflict by coming to believe that one of the appearances is true, you will still be distressed because of the reasons stated in (b). While this is a possible reading of *PH* 1.25–30, it restricts the domain of things over which one can be distressed to values. Sextus says, however, that tranquillity follows upon suspension of judgement about *everything* (*PH* 1.31, 205; *M* 11.144), and that the sceptics approach every part of philosophy—logic, physics and ethics—for the sake of tranquillity (1.18). So it seems that tranquillity does not concern only ethical opinions, and that it is safer to assume that conflict of appearances causes distress just in case there is a belief that one appearance must be true, whether or not it concerns values, even though it is not immediately clear what kind of mental state such a distress is.

Another important difference between (a) and (b) is that they require different methods of removing distress. As for (a), Sextus says that the sceptics hoped to remove distress by finding the truth, or by forming the true belief that *p* or that not-*p*. Even though they failed in their attempt to achieve tranquillity in this way, it should remain a live possibility: Sextus has no reason to deny that forming such a belief can lead to tranquillity. For, the sceptics' failure was not due to the incompatibility of truth and tranquillity, but to the fact that they were unsuccessful in finding the truth. In the case of (b), the removal of distress requires the removal of problematic belief, or the acquisition of a negative belief, that is, belief that a certain thing is by nature neither good nor bad, or belief that nothing is by nature good or bad. This is what we actually find in Sextus, as the conclusion of his ethical inquiries seems to be the thesis that nothing is good or bad by nature.<sup>16</sup> Some instances of (a) also seem to require negative beliefs. If you are distressed over the question whether you are ill, that is, if it appears to you both that you are ill and that you are not ill, your distress will be removed only if you acquire belief that you are not ill. Suspension of judgement would hardly ease your mind.<sup>17</sup> Such a case, however, actually comes under (b), as the further sources of distress are beliefs that there is something that is by nature bad, and that illness is by nature bad. If you do not have these beliefs, that is, if you are

not distressed under (b), then you should not be distressed even if you discover that you are actually ill. (More on this below.)

So it seems that straightforward methods for removing (a)- and (b)-type distress are utterly different. Sextus, however, insists that the sceptics achieve tranquillity through suspension of judgement, and that tranquillity follows suspension as a shadow follows a body. Moreover, he explicitly says that suspension removes *both* types of distress.<sup>18</sup> Now, if we consider a particular case of (a), and take into consideration the source of distress that we have identified, it is not immediately clear why tranquillity would follow suspension of judgement. Suppose you are distressed over the question whether it is the case that *p*. As I said, the source of distress is your ignorance (that is, inability to decide between conflicting appearances), joined with your desire to know and belief that one of the appearances must be true. Having suspended judgement about this particular problem, you are still ignorant, and your desire is still unsatisfied. Hence, your alleged tranquillity must be a matter either of the abandonment of your desire for knowledge or of the abandonment of belief that one of the appearances must be true. We have seen above that the first option is untenable because, among other things, it entails that the mature sceptics' tranquillity is an unstable state, since their disturbance can recur as soon as they become aware of some new arguments in favour of one of the opposed appearances and thus regain their desire for knowledge. Although it seems that there is the same problem with the second option, I will try to show later that the proto-sceptics became mature sceptics and achieved a stable state of tranquillity precisely because they abandoned the belief that one of the appearances must be true.

At first glance, things are somewhat more clear in the case of (b). If you are distressed because you believe that illness is by nature bad, then it seems that your distress can be removed if you carry out an inquiry, and as a result, suspend judgement about whether there is anything that is by nature good or bad. Moreover, it seems that suspension can remove distress even if you are actually ill. For, distress is a matter of intense pursuit of something that one believes is good, and if you suspend judgement whether health is by nature good, your pursuing it should not be accompanied by distress. However, it is obvious that suspension in this case is only the second-best in comparison to holding negative belief. For, if you suspend judgement about whether anything is by nature good or bad, then, given that sceptical suspension is only provisional, you leave open the possibility that a further inquiry may show that you should abandon your suspension and that, after all, there may be something that is by nature good or bad. And if, in the state of suspension, you carry out a particular inquiry into your health, then, if it turns out that you are indeed ill, you can reasonably expect that this *might* be bad for you, for you might lose something that might be by nature good. If, on the other hand, you believe that *nothing* is by nature good or bad, then not even the loss of your health should be the cause of distress, given the sceptics' account of distress in (b).

## III

Thus, even though there are important differences between (a) and (b), they share at least two common features. First, in both situations, an ultimate source of distress is holding a certain kind of belief. Second, it seems that in both situations, the more reliable means to remove distress is the acquisition of belief, or finding the truth, than suspension of judgement. In the case of (a), it is the acquisition of belief that one of the conflicting appearances is true, while in the case of (b), it is the acquisition of belief that nothing is good or bad by nature. Hence, it is not clear how we should understand the idea that it is suspension of judgment that removes the distress, and not finding the truth or holding belief.

Sextus is very sparse in his remarks on tranquillity and suspension. He never discusses particular instances of distress, except in the case of (b) (*M* 11.145–61). He does not give a single instance of (a), or of the manner in which suspension about *p* and not-*p* entails tranquillity. He does say, however, one important thing, namely, that tranquillity follows suspension about *everything* (*PH* 1.31, 205; *M* 11.144). To see what can be included in suspension of judgement about everything, let us make some distinctions concerning the notion of suspension. We can distinguish three situations of suspension.

First, a person may believe that *p* or that not-*p*, but then, having thoroughly considered arguments in favour of both sides, withdraw her assent and suspend judgement. This is not how the mature sceptics suspend judgement, as they do not hold beliefs. This is also not how the proto-sceptics suspend judgement, as prior to inquiry, they do not have belief either that *p* or that not-*p*. Such a suspension is specific for the dogmatists and non-philosophers (including the would-be sceptics), if they are willing to subject to sceptical therapy. In the case of the dogmatists, the immediate goal of therapy is removal of their conceit and rashness (*PH* 3.280–1)—that is, of tendency to assent precipitately—but not tranquillity. This is not to say, of course, that dogmatic philosophers and non-philosophers cannot achieve tranquillity. They can, but the point is that the mere abandonment of their particular beliefs is not sufficient, and that the more comprehensive suspension is needed. The same holds for the would-be sceptics.

Second, a person may have no belief as to which of *p* and not-*p* is true. She may believe, however, that one of them must be true, but then, having thoroughly considered arguments on both sides, abandon this belief. I have argued that this is how the proto-sceptics suspended judgement, and in their case, suspension was followed by tranquillity. I have also argued that their tranquillity is a matter of suspending belief that conflict of appearances is resolvable only by finding the truth, and Sextus insists that it requires suspension of judgement about everything.

That tranquillity requires suspension of judgement about everything may be taken to mean that suspension of judgement about a particular problem will remove distress only if a person suspends judgement about each and every

other problem she is aware of. Now, it is true that suspension about some problems requires suspension about some others. If you are distressed over the question whether body can be defined as something that can act or be acted upon, then suspension about this will remove distress only if you also suspend judgement about the question whether there are such things as cause and effect, which, in turn, may depend on suspension about something else.<sup>19</sup> Thus, if you hold some belief (for example, that there is such a thing as cause) that is somehow related to the belief that is the immediate source of distress (that body is or is not something that can be defined as cause or effect), then the abandonment of the former belief is necessary for the removal of distress concerning the latter. Not all beliefs are thus related, of course: the belief that there is something that is by nature bad does not, at least not obviously, depend on the belief that there is such a thing as cause, unless one holds that beliefs always come in a wide net, so that it is not possible to suspend any one of them without also suspending all the others. The mature sceptics may have such a view: they may insist that there is a class of, as it were, basic beliefs—for instance, beliefs that there are such things as truth and criteria of truth, or that there are signs, which are necessary for forming beliefs about non-evident things, etc.—so that suspension of these beliefs entails suspension of every other belief. However, there is no need to ascribe such a view to the proto-sceptics. We can instead assume that their suspension must have been a sort of a cognitive transformation, a radically new attitude toward the world, which is characterized by the recognition that conflicts of appearances need not be settled by finding the truth. It is in this sense that the proto-sceptics suspended judgement about everything. Once they realized that conflicts can remain unresolved, they achieved tranquillity, and came to insist that the recognition of this fact is compatible with leading a normal human life. Since their suspension was in this sense comprehensive, their tranquillity was stable.

Third, the mature sceptics do not believe either  $p$  or not- $p$ , and they do not believe that one of them must be true. Hence, they do not need to bring themselves into the state of suspension, since they are already in it. So it may be said that when they engage in inquiry into  $p$ , they examine, among other things, whether it is justifiable to abandon the state of suspension with regard to  $p$ . Of course, suspension is primarily the state reached at the end of an inquiry into a particular problem. However, Sextus also frequently says that the conclusion of an inquiry into a particular problem is that we should *remain* in the state of suspension concerning it, or that we should *keep* it in suspension.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, we may distinguish two kinds of suspension pertaining to the mature sceptics. First, there is a particular suspension, which is the result of an inquiry into a particular problem. Second, there is a general suspension, or suspension about everything, a state in which one does not hold any relevant belief, and which precedes the mature sceptics' inquiry into a particular problem.<sup>21</sup> A person who has reached such a state, when faced with the conflict of appearances, not only does not hold the belief that one of

the appearances is true but she does not hold the belief that one of the appearances *must* be true or that there is a definite solution of the conflict. The state of being in the general suspension is presumably the same thing as 'sceptical disposition' (*diathesis*) (*PH* 2.10; *M* 11.1) and is the source of the sceptical ability (*dunamis*), which is the defining characteristic of scepticism according to Sextus:

Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity. (*PH* 1.8)

Scepticism is thus defined in terms of what the sceptics are able to do, and not in terms of what they do: Sextus does not say that the sceptics always set out oppositions and induce suspension and tranquillity, but that they are able to do this. What is the scope of this ability, and why does it belong only to the Pyrrhonists? If the idea is simply that the sceptics are able to set out oppositions, then the definition is too broad, since such an ability certainly belongs to other philosophers as well. Likewise, if Sextus wants to suggest that the sceptics are able to produce a particular kind of oppositions, that is, such that result in equipollence of the opposed objects and accounts, with suspension following as a matter of psychological necessity, it is also unclear why such an ability could not be ascribed to other philosophers as well. For, it seems that, at least as far as certain kinds of philosophical problems are concerned, if we think about them deeply and thoroughly enough, we will be able to produce arguments that will render the opposed accounts equally convincing and thus induce suspension of judgement. Taken in this sense, sceptical ability may also be seen as a kind of intellectual virtue, but not as something peculiar to the Pyrrhonists. After all, were Sextus to deny such an ability to the dogmatists, he could not hope to bring them into the state of suspension.

So perhaps the definition is to be understood as saying that the sceptical philosophers are those who have the ability to set out oppositions in such a way that they result both in suspension and in tranquillity. The dogmatists are also able to suspend judgement about a particular problem, but their suspension is not accompanied by tranquillity. This is because they have a tendency always and everywhere to seek the truth, so that even after they have suspended judgement they still believe that the problem in question *must* be resolved by finding the truth. Consequently, even after suspension, they are still distressed because they think that life can be governed by true beliefs only. The sceptics, on the other hand, are not only able to set out oppositions and to suspend judgement, but also to achieve tranquillity as a result of suspension. Tranquillity results only if suspension extends to everything, that is, if they abandon the belief that the truth must be found always and everywhere. Thus the quoted definition applies primarily to the proto-sceptics and their transformation, and to the would-be sceptics, who hope to go through the same transformation.

## IV

Our problem has been to reconcile the investigative and suspensive character of Pyrrhonism. The main obstacle to characterizing Pyrrhonism as both investigative and suspensive is the fact that it seems that the mature sceptics, after they have reached tranquillity, have no motivation for further inquiry. Any inquiry they seem to be interested in after they have suspended judgement is the refutation of (relevant) beliefs needed for maintaining tranquillity. I have tried to show that the mature sceptics' removal of distress does not *ipso facto* mean removal of the desire for knowledge. I have argued that this is because distress is not just a matter of unsatisfied desire but of belief that one of the opposed appearances must be true, and having removed this belief, the sceptics can still have desire for knowledge. Of course, since their goal is still tranquillity, they will continue to engage in refutations, either to preserve tranquillity or to bring others into the state of suspension. However, they are still able to engage in positive inquiry, since they are still ignorant and may have a desire for knowledge. I have also argued that there are two kinds of suspension pertaining to the mature sceptics, and that suspension in the general sense, or sceptical disposition, is necessary for achieving and maintaining tranquillity. The mature sceptics are in such a disposition, they are not distressed because they do not hold beliefs, but nothing prevents them from engaging in further inquiry.

Moreover, it seems that nothing prevents that their inquiry results in the discovery of truth. For, if the sceptics are in the state of general suspension, this means that they also suspend judgement about, for instance, whether there is something that is by nature good or bad. This should be taken to mean that they not only suspend judgement about whether any of the proposed candidates (virtue, pleasure, health, etc.) is indeed good by nature, but also about whether the conflict between the candidates can or should be resolved. To hold that some of the candidates is indeed good by nature is to be involved in unresolvable dissent among philosophers and ordinary people and, consequently, to be distressed in this particular matter of opinion.

Now, it seems that Sextus' position in *Against the Ethicists* is not that the sceptics do *not* believe that there is anything that is good or bad by nature, but that they *believe* that there is *nothing* that is good or bad by nature.<sup>22</sup> Thus, he seems to suggest that the result of the particular inquiry into good and bad is the acquisition of a belief. This may be a major problem for the sceptics, for at least two reasons. First, because this may mean that the sceptics have thus abandoned their state of suspension and become, as far as the ethical domain is concerned, negative dogmatists. Second, because this may mean that by holding belief that nothing is good or bad by nature they have become involved in the dispute among philosophers and ordinary people, and hence can no longer enjoy the state of tranquillity in matters of opinion.

The sceptics may respond to the first objection by saying that being in the state of general suspension is nothing more than withdrawing from holding belief that the conflict among appearances (in this case, among conceptions of the



good) must always be resolved by finding the truth. Having discovered that there is a domain in which the truth can be found, or even insisting that they have found it, they can still maintain such a general attitude. For, as I have argued, to suspend judgement about everything is not to withdraw each and every particular belief, but to withdraw belief that the truth is the *only* worthwhile epistemic goal. As for the second problem, it is true that by holding belief that nothing is good or bad by nature, the sceptics have become involved in the dispute characteristic of dogmatic philosophers. But it does not follow from this that they have thereby become distressed, since the source of distress is not just holding belief or opinion, but acting in the corresponding ways. Those who believe that, for example, pain is by nature bad are not distressed simply because they are thereby involved in an unresolvable conflict of beliefs. They are distressed because this belief entails a certain kind of action, that is, an intense attempt to avoid pain. On the other hand, belief that nothing is by nature good or bad does not entail any kind of action apart from acquiescence in the immediate feeling of pain. Sextus admits that to feel pain is to be disturbed in a certain way, but insists that it is not a relevant kind of disturbance, i.e. disturbance in matters of opinion.<sup>23</sup>

Still, it is not clear what exactly is the object of the mature sceptics' inquiry. Note, to begin with, that Sextus makes a further claim about sceptical disposition. He argues that inquiry is possible only if the inquirer is in such a disposition:

[T]hose who agree that they do not know how objects are in their nature may continue without inconsistency to investigate them: those who think they know them accurately may not. For the latter, the investigation is already at its end, as they suppose, whereas for the former, the reason why any investigation is undertaken—that is, the idea that they have not found the answer—is fully present. (*PH* 2.11)

Hence, the dogmatists are not inquirers because their claim that they know how things are in their nature prevents them from undertaking any inquiry. This is the consequence of some other things they are committed to, according to Sextus' discussion in *PH* 2.1–11.<sup>24</sup> They insist that if you want to inquire into *x*, you must have previously grasped *x*, or have some concept of *x*, otherwise you do not know what is the object of your inquiry. They also insist that from this it follows that the sceptics cannot inquire, since they do not have such a prior grasp. Now, the sceptics can agree that some kind of prior grasp is needed, but they pose a dilemma to the dogmatists. If, on the one hand, having such a grasp amounts to having a thought of *x*, or a concept that does not have any implication regarding the reality of *x*, then the sceptics can inquire, since they do have such a grasp. On the other hand, the dogmatists may insist that having a grasp in this sense is not sufficient, but that something firmer is needed, something that amounts to knowledge of *x*. This, however, renders any inquiry impossible, including the dogmatists'.

It may be tempting to read *PH* 2.11 as an explanation of why Sextus introduces Pyrrhonism in the way he does at the beginning of the *Outlines*. If we

read the beginning of the *Outlines* on the background of such a dialectic, Sextus' classification of the kinds of philosophy can be seen as a classification of different approaches one can take toward the problem in Plato's *Meno* (80D5–E5). If you are a dogmatist, then you will insist that any inquiry requires a prior knowledge. For, if you allowed that anything less than knowledge can be the starting point of inquiry, then you would concede too much to the sceptics: you would admit that they are also able to inquire and, moreover, that life without knowledge is possible. According to *Meno's* paradox, however, if you have knowledge, inquiry is unnecessary; hence, the dogmatists are not inquirers. If you are a negative dogmatist, then you claim that knowledge is impossible, so that you are also precluded from inquiry, according to the paradox. Hence, you can avoid the paradox and undertake an inquiry only if you assume a sceptical stance and passively follow the ways in which the object of inquiry appears.

While I believe that this is a possible reading of the beginning of the *Outlines*, it seems as a too roundabout way to understand an apparently straightforward distinction between the three kinds of philosophy. The opening chapters of the *Outlines* are very carefully structured and it is hard to believe that Sextus would have expected his readers to recognize the dialectic from the beginning of Book 2 as a reason why there are three kinds of philosophy. Moreover, such a reading does not give a good sense of the assertion that 'the dogmatists think that they have discovered the truth': while at the beginning of the *Outlines* it is assumed that dogmatic inquiry has been carried out, the conclusion of the discussion in 2.1–11 is that it is utterly impossible—the dogmatists are 'barred from inquiry', since it is 'already at its end' (2.11). Therefore, we still have to find a better way of dealing with Sextus' tripartite classification of philosophy.

As I said, the most straightforward way to understand 'The dogmatists think that they have discovered the truth' is to take it to mean 'For every  $p$  that has been the object of their inquiry, the dogmatists think that they have discovered whether it is true or false'. The problem was that this implies that 'The sceptics are still investigating' is to be understood as 'For every  $p$  that has been the object of philosophical inquiry, and about which the dogmatists think that they have discovered whether it is true or false, the sceptics are still investigating whether it is true or false', which seemed incompatible with the mature sceptics' suspension of every dogmatic belief. Now that we have shown that the achievement of tranquillity does not necessarily entail lack of motivation for inquiry, it seems that this may be the adequate explanation after all, and that Sextus' point is simply that the sceptics are still searching for truth. They have abandoned belief that the truth should in any case be discovered, but this does not entail that they cannot search for it. There are, however, at least three problems with this.

First, it is still not clear why Sextus wants to deny the dogmatists the title of inquirers. For, as I said, he has no obvious reason to assert that dogmatic philosophy is completed, and if he thinks that the dogmatists have discovered all general and basic truths, there is still many details that are yet to be discovered. If he wants to claim that the dogmatists are unable to inquire for the

reasons given in *PH* 2.2–11, then why he call them philosophers? He says in *PH* 2.6 that if we endorse the dogmatic requirement that inquiry presupposes a firm grasp of its object, then ‘pretty well all of their dogmatic philosophy will be confounded and the sceptical philosophy rigorously advanced’.

Second, it is also not clear that the activity of the mature sceptics should be understood exclusively in terms of the search for truth. As far as I can see, Sextus never says that they are searching for truth: he usually says that they are investigating or examining things or statements, without further qualification. He does not say that the sceptics are searching for truth either in *PH* 1.1–3 or in 1.7, passages in which he, as we have seen, describes the Pyrrhonists as inquirers. Perin argues that from Sextus’ suggestion, in 1.1–3, that the sceptic ‘is still doing *the very thing* the dogmatic philosopher is no longer doing’ it follows that the sceptic is also searching for truth (Perin 2010: 8). It seems to me, however, that what follows is only that the sceptic is searching, or, rather, is engaged in activity of investigating (*zēteîn*), and *zēteîn* in Sextus has a much broader sense than ‘searching for truth’.<sup>25</sup> Sextus does say in *PH* 1.12 and 26 (quoted above) that the sceptics are searching for truth, but this remark applies to the proto-sceptics, not to the mature sceptics. The same is true of *M* 1.6–7, where he explicitly distinguishes the original sceptics, who ‘approached philosophy wishing to get at the truth’ and ‘set out to grasp the liberal studies and sought to learn the truth here as well’, from the later sceptics, whose goal is only to ‘select and put the effective arguments against the liberal studies’.<sup>26</sup>

Third, truth and the true are non-evident objects, and the sceptics suspend judgement about their reality (*PH* 2.80–94; *M* 8.1–140). They are able to inquire into them just as into any other philosophical problem, but as long as they cannot firmly assert what it is for something to be true, what are the truth-bearers, what are the truthmakers, etc., they are not in a position to claim that the overall goal of their inquiries is to deliver *true* propositions. If they were to claim this, they would be rightly charged for inconsistency. Of course, we may call a proposition true without having a theory of truth; but if the sceptics were to say this, one might bring against them the same charge that they standardly bring against the dogmatists: that even if they come upon the object of their inquiry, they will not be able to recognize it (see e.g. *M* 8.322–6).

If this is so, then at the beginning of the *Outlines* Sextus cannot assume that philosophy is the search for truth: it is so only for the dogmatists. In a more general sense, applicable to the sceptics as well, philosophy is just an inquiry into certain things, and for the sceptics, its epistemic goal is still open. They are still not in a position to say that philosophy can or cannot deliver true propositions about its objects. It is in this sense, I presume, that they are still investigating: they are still investigating what attitude to take toward the objects investigated in philosophy. The dogmatists’ discovery, on the other hand, is that the outcome of every philosophical inquiry must be a true proposition. To put it differently: the dogmatists have discovered things like the good, the bad, cause, god, place, time, etc., and thereby they have discovered that we can make true and false propositions about them. The sceptics are still investigating

whether these things exist or not, and whether we can say anything truly or falsely about them; they expect 'it to be possible for some things actually to be apprehended' (*PH* 1.226), but they are still not able to say what exactly we can reasonably expect from philosophical inquiry as such. What they have discovered thus far is that the way in which certain objects are conceived by the various dogmatic schools is not satisfactory. To say that they thereby completed their inquiry would be to imply that the only available conception of philosophy is that of the dogmatists.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The abbreviation 'PH' refers to the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (according to the Greek title *Purrhōneioi hupotupōseis*) and the abbreviation 'M' to *Adversus Mathematicos* (I follow convention and take it as including both *Adversus Mathematicos* in the proper sense—that is, six books against the liberal arts—and the treatises *Against the Logicians*, *Against the Physicists* and *Against the Ethicists*). All translations from *PH* are by Annas and Barnes 2000, occasionally with modifications.

<sup>2</sup> I will use the words 'Pyrrhonist' and 'sceptic' interchangeably.

<sup>3</sup> For example, in *PH* 1.4, 5, 11, 236; 2.6, 9; *M* 7.30, 8.191.

<sup>4</sup> Barnes 2007: 329. See also Striker 2001.

<sup>5</sup> The latest datable reference in Sextus' work is to the Emperor Tiberius (42 BC–AD 37) (*PH* 1.84), while most scholars place him late in the second century AD. It seems that he does not discuss philosophical movements which arose after the first century BC. See House 1980: 227–31; Floridi 2002: 2–5.

<sup>6</sup> For various ways in which the sceptics' suspension is qualified, see, above all, *PH* 1.187–208.

<sup>7</sup> On sceptics' philanthropic inclinations, see *PH* 3.280–1; Annas 1993: 245–8; Machuca 2006.

<sup>8</sup> See Perin 2010: 8.

<sup>9</sup> On *aporia* in Sextus, see Woodruff 1988: esp. 141–3, who argues, however, that Sextus is uncomfortable with calling his own position 'aporetic scepticism', and that this title should be reserved for the earlier Pyrrhonist revival, that of Aenesidemus and Agrippa.

<sup>10</sup> Sextus does argue in *PH* 2.1–10 that the dogmatists cannot dispute each others' claims, but his argument is dialectical and, in any case, it can hardly be read into the opening lines of the *Outlines*.

<sup>11</sup> See Perin 2010: 7–32, who argues that for the Pyrrhonists the discovery of truth is an end in itself.

<sup>12</sup> For (a), see *PH* 1.12, 26; for (b), see *PH* 1.27–8; *M* 11.112–17.

<sup>13</sup> Perin thinks that this is sufficient to show that the Pyrrhonists, after all, do have an independent interest in truth: '[t]he Sceptic is distressed, and so motivated to seek

tranquillity, precisely because he has an interest in the discovery of truth that is *not* an interest in it as a means to tranquillity' (Perin 2010: 24).

<sup>14</sup> An anonymous referee has objected that the definition of scepticism in *PH* 1.8 can more naturally be taken as suggesting that tranquillity is something that must be worked at again and again, so that there is no reason to attribute to Sextus the idea that tranquillity is stable. Below (end of Section III) I will propose a different reading of 1.8.

<sup>15</sup> For a different example, see Grgić 2006: 149.

<sup>16</sup> See, above all, *M* 11.68–95, 110, 118, 140; *PH* 3.178; Bett 1997: xii–xix. However, it is far from clear that Sextus endorses negative dogmatism in ethics. For a detailed recent discussion, see Machuca 2011.

<sup>17</sup> See Barnes 2007: 328.

<sup>18</sup> For the idea that suspension removes the (a)-type distress, see e.g. *PH* 1.25, 29; for the idea that it removes the (b)-type distress, see e.g. *PH* 1.27 ('But those who make no determination about what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are tranquil'); 3.235; *M* 11.111.

<sup>19</sup> 'Some say that a body is that which can act and be acted upon. But so far as this concept goes, bodies are inapprehensible. For causes are inapprehensible, as we have suggested; and if we cannot say whether there are any causes, we cannot say either whether anything is acted upon—for what is acted upon is certainly acted upon by a cause. But if both causes and what is acted upon are inapprehensible, for this reason bodies too will be inapprehensible' (*PH* 3.38). I assume that Sextus does not endorse the thesis that body and cause are inapprehensible, but that he puts it forward only as a part of the argument that purports to show that we should suspend judgement about them.

<sup>20</sup> See *M* 8.118, 177, 258, 259, 328, 401; 9.436.

<sup>21</sup> For a distinction between the general suspension of judgement about everything and particular suspensions, see Sextus' remark on Arcesilaus in *PH* 1.232–3.

<sup>22</sup> See note 16.

<sup>23</sup> See *PH* 1.29–30; 3.236; *M* 11.149.

<sup>24</sup> See on this Grgić 2008 and Fine 2010.

<sup>25</sup> See the classification in Palmer 2000: 366–7.

<sup>26</sup> Trans. Blank 1998. There are some passages where Sextus does say that the object of philosophical inquiry is the truth, but there he is clearly referring to dogmatic philosophy. See, e.g., *M* 7.24.

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