| Abstract (croatian) | Što pod utjecajem humanističkih prijevoda antičkih filozofa različitih orijentacija, a što zahvaljujući kritičkom preispitivanju pretpostavki jednog stoljećima prihvaćanog svjetonazora, u razdoblju humanizma i renesanse biva ponovno aktualizirano pitanje smisla čovjekova opstanka uz dovođenje u pitanje uvriježenog sustava vrijednosti. To između ostalog biva u filozofa spomenutog razdoblja tematizirano u vidu dileme: življenje za duhovne vrednote ili pak za voluptates (i to nadasve voluptates corporis), življenje kojemu se kao ideal nameće bios theoretikos ili življenje, u kojem se, imajući svagda pred očima ponajprije prolaznost svega ljudskog, teži za nepomućenošću što se sastoji u izbjegavanju svakog, a napose umnog napora i posebice onda filozofiranja.
U tom kontekstu valja iščitavati i Trankvilov posve humanistički intoniran traktat o tome treba li filozofirati, koji je zapravo reakcija na teze suvremenika uperene protiv tradicionalnog sustava moralnih vrednota. Pritom se Trankvil priklanja tradicionalističkoj liniji koja počiva na platoničko-stoičko-kršćanskom tumačenju temeljnih vrednota ljudskog življenja, a u kojem upravo filozofiji, kao onoj disciplini koja omogućuje ozbljenje najviših vrednota (time što pripravlja čovjeka za dosizanje najvišeg cilja-onog summum bonum što se sastoji u contemplatio divinae mentis) pripada presudna uloga. U funkciji obrane takova sustava moralnih vrednota jest onda i poimanje duše, izloženo u traktatu što je umetnut u glavnu raspravu, o potrebi i značenju filozofiranja. I u tom traktatu o duši Trankvil se opredjeljuje uglavnom za tradicionalističku poziciju braneći mnogim argumentima besmrtnost duše, što je pretpostavka za mogućnost impostiranja vrline na način na koji to čini Trankvil (vrlina koja svoju nagradu zadobiva poslije čovjekove smrti, nakon odvajanja duše od tijela).
Trankvilovi stavovi o duši odnosno međusobnom odnosu dijelova duše nisu posve u skladu s aristotelovsko-tomističkom koncepcijom, no oni se isto tako ne mogu označiti ni kao platonički (prema Tominoj interpretaciji) u tom smislu da bi jednoznačno li bez ostatka branili tezu o više duša u čovjeku.
Trankvilu je, naime, u aristotelovska-kršćanskoj tradiciji učenja o duši neprihvatljiva teza o objedinljivosti bitno različitih 'Određenja i svojstava u jednoj duši, napose pak smrtnosti i besmrtnosti, te on insistira na razgraničenju pojedinih bitno različitih dijelova duše, odnosno triju duša, tj. na tezi o intelektivnoj kao eminentno ljudskoj duši, besmrtnoj i od Boga stvorenoj. Pritom valja istaći da njegovi stavovi u vezi s tim nisu svagda posve jasno iskazani i jednoznačno odredivi. Istovremeno se može ustvrditi da problem,i što se u vezi s dušom javljaju i što proizlaze ,iz njegove pozicije nisu u tekstu podrobnije razrađeni. |
| Abstract (english) | Partly influenced by the humanist translations of differently oriented ancient philosophers, partly raised in the critical examination of the assumptions which formed a Weltanschauung accepted for centuries, the Renaissance anew made topical the question about the sense of man's existence, challinging the same time the deep-rooted system of values. The Renaissance philosophers, among other things, discuss this question in the form of a dilemma: to devote one's life to the spiritual values or to the voluptates (exceedingly voluptates corporis), the life in which the bios theoretikos intrudes as ideal, or the life in which, first of all bearing in mind the transitoriness of everything human, one longs for the untroubledness which consists in avoiding any exertion, in particular the intellectual one, and then especially the exertion of practising philosophy.
In this context we have to understand Trankvil’s treatise, which is entirely composed in the humanist spirit, and wich deals with the question whether there is a need of practising philosophy. As a matter of fact, this treatise is a reaction on his contemporaries's theses directed against the traditional system of values. Trankvil has a propensity for the traditionalist trend which is founded on the Platonic-Stoic-Christian interpretation of the fundamental values of human life, and tin which the crucial role belongs precisely to the philosophy, as the branch that makes possible the realization of the supreme values (owing to the fact that it prepares the man for the attainment of the highest goal, summum bonum, which consists in contemplation divinae mentis.
The understanding of the soul (exposed in the treatise which is inserted into the main essay on the need and importance of practising philosophy) functions as an apology of such a system of values as well. In this treatise on the soul Trankvil chiefly takes Slide with the traditionalist position, defending the immortality of the soul wih many arguments, and this is the presupposition for the possibility of laying down the virtue in the manner Trankvil does lit (the virtue which gains its prize after man's death, thus after separation of the soul from the body).
Trankvil's views on the soul and the mutual relationship of the parts of the soul, respectively, are not entirely in harmony with the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, but ms views cannot be labeled 'as Platonic (according to Thomas' interpretation), in the sense that they could unequivocally and completely defend the thesis about many souls of the man.
For Trankvil, namely, the thesis of the Aristotelian-Christian traditional doctrine of the soul is unacceptable, i.e. the thesis which states the possibility of unifing essentially different determinations and properties in one soul, particularly the mortality and the immortality. He insists on the demarcation of the single, essentially diferent parts of the soul, or of the three souls, i.e. on the thesis about the intellectual soul as eminently human, immortal and created by God. On this occasion we should emphasize that his views on this topic are not always stated in an entirely clear man•ner and are not unequivocally determinable. At the same time we can cam that the problems which arise in connection with the soul and which follow from his position, are not thoroughly elaborated in the text. |
