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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Grasping Aristotle's Intellect
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 26 (2015); 13-31. urn:nbn:hr:261:017226
Gregorić, Pavel; Pfeiffer, Christian

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Gregorić, P. & Pfeiffer, C. (2015). Grasping Aristotle's Intellect. Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 26., 13-31. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:017226

Gregorić, Pavel and Christian Pfeiffer. "Grasping Aristotle's Intellect." Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, vol. 26, 2015, pp. 13-31. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:017226

Gregorić, Pavel and Christian Pfeiffer. "Grasping Aristotle's Intellect." Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 26 (2015): 13-31. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:017226

Gregorić, P. and Pfeiffer, C. (2015) 'Grasping Aristotle's Intellect', Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 26, pp. 13-31. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:017226 (Accessed 19 November 2024)

Gregorić P, Pfeiffer C. Grasping Aristotle's Intellect. Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale [Internet]. 2015 [cited 2024 November 19];26:13-31. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:017226

P. Gregorić and C. Pfeiffer, "Grasping Aristotle's Intellect", Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, vol. 26, pp. 13-31, 2015. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:017226. [Accessed: 19 November 2024]

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Metadata
Title (english)Grasping Aristotle's Intellect
AuthorPavel Gregorić
AuthorChristian Pfeiffer
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
In this paper we offer a novel interpretation of the second aporia stated in Aristotle’s De Anima III.4, the question whether the intellect can think itself. We propose that the aporia does not aim at reflexive awareness of one’s own thoughts, as is commonly assumed, but relies on a more objectivist account. The question, we claim, is whether the intellect can itself become an object of intellectual grasp. On our interpretation of III.4, Aristotle argues that the intellect is itself thinkable insofar as it thinks its objects, which means that grasping the intellect is a matter of grasping the objects that it thinks. We show that, on this account, there is no difference in the way one grasps one’s own intellect and the way one grasps another person’s intellect.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review - international
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleDocumenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
Numberingvol. 26, pp. 13-31
p-ISSN1122-5750
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:017226
Publication2015
Document URLhttps://www.sismelfirenze.it/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=48:documenti-e-studi-sulla-tradizione-filosofica-medievale&Itemid=182&lang=it
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
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Created on2021-06-23 13:17:37